California's Three Strikes Law-Should
A Juvenile Adjudication Be A Ball Or A
Strike?*
Californias Three Strikes sentencing law counts non-jury trial
juvenile adjudications as strikes to enlarge sentences for current
felony convictions. This Comment discusses the due process and
equal protection issues raised by Three Strikes 's use of juvenile
adjudications as strikes. This Comment concludes that Three Strikes
will withstand a due process challenge. Also, an equal protection
challenge based on the procedural dijferences between the criminal
and juvenile justice systems will likely fail.
However, some
meritorious equal protection claims may arise. The Comment ends
with recommended statutory changes.

The nightmare began for Polly Klaas's parents on October 1, 1993.
An armed intruder abducted twelve-year-old Polly from her home in
Petaluma, California as her mother slept in an adjoining bedroom. 1 The
intruder surprised Polly and her two friends who were spending the night
when he entered Polly's bedroom brandishing a knife. The man bound
Polly's two friends and took Polly away. By the time the girls broke
free and alerted Polly's mother, the man and Polly were gone. After an
extensive search, police found Polly's dead body on December 4, 1993.
The man charged with kidnapping and murdering Polly, Richard Allen
Davis, was a twice-convicted kidnapper. Davis had been paroled in June
1993, after serving eight years of a sixteen-year sentence. 2

* Thanks to Professor Cynthia Lee for her guidance and advice and to my
husband John for his patience and support.
I. Christine Spolar, California Town Cries as Polly Klaas is Found: TwiceConvicted Suspect Faces Murder, Kidnapping Charges in Abduction of 12-Year-Old,
WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1993, at A6.
2. Id.
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The Polly Klaas story led to the legislature's speedy enactment of
California's toughest anti-crime law. 3 On March 7, 1994, just three
months after the arrest of Richard Allen Davis, the California Legislature
passed Assembly Bill 971. 4 This bill, which amended section 667 of
the California Penal Code, created a mandatory sentencing structure for
recidivists. The bill, known as the "Three Strikes and You're Out" law,
passed as an emergency statute and took immediate effect. 5
On November 8, 1994, California voters also voiced their concern
about crime by passing Proposition 184. 6 Proposition 184, also known

3. Vlae Kershner & Greg Lucas, 'Three Strikes' Signed Into Law/Wilson Says
'Career Criminals' Will Become 'Career Inmates', S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1994, at Al.
The Klaas family allowed politicians to use Polly's funeral to promote the Three Strikes
anti-crime bill. This promotion resulted in the quick passage of the Three Strikes bill,
which had been bogged down in committee for the past year. Id
4. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667 (West Supp. 1995). The senate approved the bill by
a vote of 29 to 7. Dana Wilkie, Senate OKs Tough '3 Strikes'; Wilson Says He 'II Sign
It, But Initiative Effort Will Go Forward, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 4, 1994, at Al.
The assembly approved the bill by a vote of 59 to 10. Dan Morain, 'Three Strikes' Bills
Sweep State Assembly, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1994, at Al.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667. Section Two of Assembly Bill 971 provides:
This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the
Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The facts constituting the
necessity are:
In order to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those
who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious or violent
felony offenses, and to protect the public from the imminent threat posed by
those repeat felony offenders, it is necessary that this act take effect immediately.
1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 12 (West).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1995). The initiative passed
overwhelmingly with 71.9% voter approval. Tom Dressiar, Few Surprises in Voting,
L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 10, 1994, at 8.
While a public perception of increased violent crime existed, the reality was the crime
rate in 1993 was the lowest since 1980 in all categories of offenses except for violent
juvenile crime. James Fox, Three Strikes and You're Out-A Prosecutor's Perspective,
CAL. CRIM. DEF. PRAC. REP., Nov. 1994, at 411.
Although the crime rate was going down prior to the passage of Three Strikes, a Rand
report suggests Three Strikes will further reduce the crime rate. Specifically, the Rand
report concluded:
"[T]hree strikes" will reduce the number of serious crimes committed in
California an average of 338,000 a year over the next quarter century, which
is 28 percent below the number of serious crimes expected in the absence of
the law. At an annual projected cost (in current dollars) of$5.5 billion for new
prisons and prison operations, that works out to $16,300 for every serious
crime prevented. Put another way, every $5 million in spending under the law
is projected to prevent 1 murder, 20 rapes, 55 robberies, 120 cases of
aggravated assault, 110 burglaries, and 5 cases of arson.
Jonathan Marshall, Balancing the Three Strikes Equation: The Benefits of Locking Up
Career Criminals May Be Sufficientto Justify the Cost, CAL. LA WYER, Feb. 1995, at 56,
57-58.
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as "Three Strikes and You're Out," added section 1170.12 to the Penal
Code and was similar to Assembly Bill 971. 7
Both Three Strikes provisions implemented the following mandatory
sentencing scheme. When a defendant who has a prior conviction8 for
a "serious" or "violent" felony 9 is subsequently convicted of another
felony, 10 he or she receives double the term of punishment for the

The Rand study' s predictions may prove to be accurate as the state crime rate dropped
overall by 6.5% in 1994, with a 6.3% drop in violent crimes. Editorials, Crime: Good
News and Bad; Even Though the Overall Crime Rate Is Declining, Juvenile Crime Is
Continuing to Rise, and That's a Troubling Statistic,FRESNO BEE, July 18, 1995, at B4.
California Attorney General Dan Lungren attributed some of the drop to Three Strikes.
However, other factors may also be responsible for the drop. For example, the number
of males aged 20 to 30 years old declined. This group has typically been the most prone
to violent crime. Id.
While the general crime rate has declined, the juvenile crime rate has increased
dramatically over the past decade. Between 1984 and 1994 the juvenile crime rate for
violent crimes, which includes rape and homicide, increased by 53%. Id. Under Three
Strikes, the possibility that the commission of a violent or serious felony by a juvenile
may count as a strike in the future, even when the juvenile is adjudicated in the juvenile
system, has arguably not had a deterrent effect thus far.
7. See infra notes 11, 12, 13, 97, 99, 177, 178, and 179 for the text of the
statutes.
8. The use of prior convictions under Penal Code § 667 has been consistently
upheld under ex post facto challenges. See People v. Brady, 34 Cal. App. 4th 65, 40
Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (1995); People v. Sipe, 36 Cal. App. 4th 468, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266
(1995); People v. Reed, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1608, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 47; People v. Hatcher,
33 Cal. App. 4th 1526, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801 (1995). As the Sipe court observed, with
recidivist statutes the greater penalties for the current offense are imposed because of the
defendant's habitual criminal status. 36 Cal. App. 4th at 479, 42 Cal. Rptr 2d at 271.
The current punishment is levied for the current offense, not as punishment for the prior
offenses. Id. Ex post facto challenges under § 1170.12 would presumably also fail as
the language regarding the use of prior convictions is similar to § 667. Reed, 33 Cal.
App. 4th at 1609 n.2, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47 n.2.
Ex post facto laws are prohibited under both the United States and California
Constitutions. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall ... pass any ... ex post
facto law."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (An "ex post facto law ... may not be passed.").
9. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)(l), 1170.12(b)(l) (West Supp. 1995). Both
Three Strikes statutes define prior strike convictions as violent felonies listed in § 667 .5
of the Penal Code and serious felonies listed in § 1192. 7 of the Penal Code. Id. Violent
felonies in§ 667.5 include murder, rape, and arson. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.5 (West
1988 & Supp. 1995). Serious felonies listed in§ 1192.7 include mayhem, kidnapping,
and burglary of an inhabited dwelling house. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192. 7(c) (West 1982
& Supp. 1995). See infra note 102 for the list of violent felonies in § 667 .5 and note
103 for the list of serious felonies in § 1192. 7 of the Penal Code.
10. For example, Frankie Roy Kingery was recently sentenced to 25 years to life
for stealing two packages of cigarettes valued at less than $5. Cigarettes Cost Thie/25
Years Under 3 Strikes, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 12, 1995, at B7. However, during the
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current felony conviction. 11 If a defendant who is charged with any
felony has two or more prior "serious" or "violent" felony convictions,
then the term of punishment for the current felony conviction is
increased to twenty-five years to life. 12 Both Three Strikes provisions

cigarette theft Kingery did draw a knife on a store employee who tried to prevent the
crime. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kingery pied guilty to petty theft and the
prosecutors dropped the knife charge. Kingery fell under the Three Strikes sentencing
scheme because of his past violent behavior that resulted in convictions for strike
offenses. Id
A study of the Three Strikes law by the Legislative Analysts' office found that since
March 1994, 70% of the second and third strike cases filed were against defendants
arrested for non-violent and non-serious felonies. Hallye Jordan, Three Strikes Hit
Mostly Non-Violent, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 9, 1995, at 1, 10. However, Three Strikes
sentencing may not be imposed on all charged non-violent felonies. If the current
charged felony is a "wobbler," a crime that may be treated as a felony or misdemeanor
under § 17 of the California Penal Code, the court still has the power to reduce the
felony charge to a misdemeanor. If the charge is reduced to a misdemeanor, the case
is removed from the reach of Three Strikes because only a current felony conviction
triggers the Three Strikes sentencing scheme. People v. Superior Court (Perez), 38 Cal.
App. 4th 347, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (1995) (affirming trial court's action in reducing a
felony for receiving stolen property to a misdemeanor); People v. Trausch, 36 Cal. App.
4th 1239, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995) (affirming trial court's reduction offelony second
degree burglary for breaking a bakery window and stealing a cake to a misdemeanor
charge).
"Wobblers" arise under § 17 of the Penal Code, which provides:
(a) A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in
the state prison. Every other crime or public offense is a misdemeanor except
those offenses that are classified as infractions.
(b) When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment
in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a
misdemeanor for all purposes under the following circumstances:
(1) After a judgment imposing a punishment other than imprisonment in
the state prison.
(3) When the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of
sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on application of the
defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to
be a misdemeanor.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(e)(l), 1170.12(c)(l) (West Supp. 1995). These
sections provide, "If a defendant has one prior felony conviction that has been pied and
proved, the determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term shall be twice
the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction." Id
12. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667( e)(2)(A), 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995). The
text of§ 667 states:
If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions as defined in
subdivision (d) [this subdivision defines juvenile adjudications as priors] that
have been pled and proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be
an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of:
(i) Three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current
felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions.
(ii) Imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years.
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also ensure that a convicted felon serves at least eighty percent of his or
her sentence by limiting the credits a convict can receive for good
behavior and participation to one-fifth of the total term of imprisonment.13

(iii) The term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for the
underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable under Chapter 4.5
(commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or any period prescribed
by Section 190 or 3046.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
Section 1170.12(c)(2)(A) provides:
If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions, as defined in
paragraph ( 1) of subdivision (b) [juvenile adjudications are listed in paragraph
(3) of subdivision (b) and are therefore excluded in this situation], that have
been pied and proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be an
indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of
(i) three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current
felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions, or
(ii) twenty-five years, or
(iii) the term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for the
underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable under Chapter 4.5
(commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or any period prescribed
by Section 190 or 3046.
CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(c)(5), 1170.12(a)(5) (West Supp. 1995). These
sections state, "The total amount of credits awarded pursuantto Article 2.5 (commencing
with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 shall not exceed one-fifth of the
total term ofimprisonment imposed and shall not accrue until the defendant is physically
placed in the state prison." Id.
Although Three Strikes seems to clearly command the defendant serve 80% of the
sentence, there are ways around this outcome. Regina Edwards, a 43-year-old prisoner
in the final stages of AIDS, was sentenced to 32 months for petty theft with a prior
under Three Strikes based on her prior strike conviction. Anne Krueger, Dying Felon
to Be Freed Despite 3 Strikes, SAN DIEGO UNION-Trib., Aug. 8, 1995, at B3. Under
Three Strikes, Edwards would be required to serve at least 25 months of her sentence.
Edwards sought early release in June 1995, but the court denied her request pursuant to
Three Strikes. Subsequently, the Deputy District Attorney agreed to drop the prior strike
allegation, which made Edwards eligible for release because Edwards had only six
months to live. Thereafter, a San Diego County Superior Court Judge granted Edwards' s
release request. Id.
Currently, there is a bill before the California Senate that would provide for
compassionate release for those with terminal illnesses including those prisoners
sentenced under Three Strikes. Anne Krueger, Dying Woman Due Release in '3-Strikes'
Case, SAN DIEGO UNION-Trib., Aug. 4, 1995, at Al.
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A particularly controversial part of the Three Strikes statutes relates
to juvenile adjudications. 14 Under both provisions, a juvenile adjudication counts as a prior felony conviction if the person committed a listed
felony offense when he or she was sixteen years of age or older, was
found a "fit and proper subject" for the juvenile court, and was adjudged
a ward of the juvenile court. 15 Opponents of Three Strikes claim that
using juvenile adjudications as strikes violates the United States and
California Constitutions. 16 Using a juvenile adjudication as a strike
arguably violates a person's due process rights because in the juvenile
court system a juvenile does not have a right to a jury trial. 17
The legal community has developed different approaches to deal with
this issue. In San Francisco, the Public Defender has directed his
deputies to request jury trials in juvenile proceedings. 18 Santa Clara
County Judge Leonard Sprinkles has advised defense attorneys that he
is inclined to give juveniles who are sixteen years of age or older jury
trials because of Three Strikes. 19 However, another Santa Clara County
judge, Allen Danner, has said he will refuse to allow juveniles to have
jury trials because no statutory ground exists for allowing juveniles to

14. Hallye Jordan, Constitutional Challenges Set for '3 Strikes': Neither Side
Satisfied, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 8, 1994, at 1. California State Attorney General Dan
Lungren expressed concern that the juvenile adjudication portion of Three Strikes may
be ruled unconstitutional. Lungren said, "I have to admit that it's one of those things
I could argue on either side .... It's 50-50 on what a court would do." Rick Orlov,
Lungren Forms Task Force to Aid in Enforcing 'Three Strikes' Law, L.A. DAILY NEWS,
Mar. 12, 1994, at N4.
In this Comment, a juvenile adjudication refers to a finding of delinquency in the
juvenile court. A finding of delinquency is the juvenile court's counterpart to a felony
conviction.
15. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(d)(3), 1170.12(b)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1995). See
infra note 99 for the text of these provisions.
16. "[S]ome attorneys worry that the new law will deny youngsters due process
rights because juveniles are not tried before a jury, but an offense may count as a
'strike."' Dean E. Murphy & Andrea Ford, A Scramble to Scrutinize '3 Strikes' Law,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1994, at B3.
17. Jordan, supra note 14, at 1. The United States Supreme Court has held that
a juvenile does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971). In California, youths found to be fit and proper subjects for the
juvenile court system are not afforded a right to trial by jury under the California
Constitution. In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924).
18. Dan Morain, Citing '3 Strikes,' Lawyers to Shun Plea Bargains, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1994, at Al.
19. Charles Finney, 'Three Strikes' Hits Hard in Juvenile Court, L.A. DAILY J.,
Apr. 8, 1994, at 1. A juvenile adjudication only counts as a strike when several
conditions are met--one of which is the juvenile prior must have been committed when
the defendant was at least 16 years old. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)(3)(A),
1170.12(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1995). See infra note 99 for the text of these sections.
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have jury trials in the juvenile court system. 20 In addition, the Alameda
County District Attorney has said he will not enforce the juvenile strike
provision because he believes it is unconstitutional. 21 In contrast, other
prosecutors have stated that they plan to use juvenile adjudications as
strikes as required by the Three Strikes laws. 22
The courts and legislature need to resolve the uncertainties in Three
Strikes. Today, treatment of juvenile adjudications under California's
Three Strikes laws varies by county and courtroom. The legal consequences of a person's actions should be based on culpability, not
geographic location.
This Comment discusses the legal questions raised by the juvenile
adjudication portion of the Three Strikes provisions and makes
suggestions to the legislature on how these issues should be handled.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on the
procedural development of the juvenile justice system in the United
States and California. In Part II, California law on the use of juvenile
adjudications in sentencing before the enactment of Three Strikes is
discussed. Part III provides a detailed analysis of the juvenile adjudication portions of the Three Strikes provisions. The constitutional issues
concerning the use of juvenile adjudications to increase sentences are
addressed in Part IV. Part V provides a summary of recommendations
to the legislature.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM

The juvenile court system, which originated in this country at the end
of the last century, was established to rehabilitate and treat children. 23
Advocates justified the system's lack of constitutionally prescribed,

20. Finney, supra note 19, at 4. Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
vests the power to raise the issue of whether a juvenile should be certified to a criminal
proceeding in the prosecutor. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 707 (West 1984 & Supp.
1995). See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
21. Morain, supra note 18, at Al.
22. Id at Al 5. While some prosecutors plan to use juvenile adjudications as
strikes, it may be difficult to prove prior juvenile adjudications because juvenile court
records are subsequently sealed. Moreover, the juvenile court disposes of most juvenile
cases informally. Id
23. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1967).
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procedural safeguards by emphasizing its non-adversarial purposes. 24
The state was said to be proceeding as parens patriae. 25 The juveniles
were deemed to have a right to custody, that is to have someone take
care of them, but not a right to liberty. 26 Thus, the system did not
violate any of the child's rights because the child had none. Instead, the
juvenile courts provided the child with the custody to which he or she
was entitled. 27 By classifying the juvenile proceedings as civil, instead
of criminal, the states did not have to provide the same procedural
safeguards before depriving a juvenile of his or her liberty. 28
Despite the noble motives of the juvenile court system's architects, the
system fell short of achieving its objectives. In 1967, the United States
Supreme Court stated, in In re Gault, that the absence of due process
principles in juvenile proceedings had frequently resulted in arbitrariness
and unfaimess. 29 These results caused the Court to rule that "[u]nder
our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court. "30 Accordingly, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required juveniles to be provided
with the same rights as adults in a criminal trial with respect to the right
to receive adequate notice of the charges, the right to have counsel, the
right against self-incrimination, and the right to confront one's accusers.31

24. Id. at 16.
25. Id. "Parens patriae ... refers traditionally to role of [the] state as sovereign
and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th
ed. 1979). But see Gault, 387 U.S. at 16 (Original meaning of in loco parentis was
derived from chancery practice where state's power to act was designed to protect a
child's property interest. No historical precedent indicates use of the doctrine in criminal
law.).
26. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17 n.21.
27. Id. at 17.
28. Id. at 12-17.
29. Id. at 17-21 (a 15-year-old boy was committed to a state school for making
lewd phone calls while on a six-month probation for being in the company of a boy who
stole a lady's purse).
30. Id. at 28. The Court noted that a boy charged with misconduct may be
committed to an institution for years. Labeling the institution an Industrial School, the
Court observed, was of no constitutional consequence. The boy's life became
institutionalized upon confinement. Parents and friends were replaced by guards,
custodians, state employees, and delinquents who had committed serious to minor crimes.
Based on these facts, the Court held that "it would be extraordinary if our Constitution
did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase
'due process."' Id. at 27-28.
31. Id. at 33, 36, 55, 56. The Court noted that if the youth had been over 18, he
would have been afforded substantial rights under Arizona's laws and the United States
Constitution. The juvenile justice system did not afford the boy many of these rights.
The Court observed, "So wide a gulf between the State's treatment of the adult and of
the child requires a bridge sturdier than mere verbiage, and reasons more persuasive than

1304

[VOL. 32: 1297, 1995]

Three Strikes Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

In 1970, the United States Supreme Court further expanded the due
process requirements of the juvenile justice system. 32 In In re Winship,
the Court noted that juvenile and criminal proceedings were similar
because a juvenile ward, like an adult convict, could lose his or her
liberty for many years. 33 Accordingly, the Court held that due process
required an offense to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile
adjudications. 34
One year later, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of a right to a
jury trial in juvenile court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. 35 The
McKeiver Court observed that although the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution guaranteed the right to a jury trial in all
criminal proceedings, the cases establishing this right had not decided
the issue of a juvenile's right to a jury trial in juvenile court. 36 In
analyzing this issue, the McKeiver Court began by noting that due
process is satisfied in juvenile proceedings as long as the proceeding is
fundamentally fair. 37 The McKeiver Court observed that when the
Gault and Winship Courts applied the fundamental fairness standard,
they emphasized fact finding procedures. 38 A jury trial, according to
the McKeiver Court, was not required for accurate fact finding. 39

cliche can provide." Id. at 29-30.
32 . In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (minor charged as delinquent for taking
money from a woman's pocketbook).
33. Id. at 365-68.
34. Id. at 368. The Court held, "In sum, the constitutional safeguard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a
delinquency proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault." Id.
35. 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (per curiam). In McKeiver, a 16-year-old boy was
charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen property. He appealed the juvenile
court finding of delinquency because he was not afforded a right to trial by jury.
McKeiver argued he was entitled to a jury trial because the juvenile court proceedings
were substantially similar to a criminal trial. For example, McKeiver pointed out that
juvenile courtrooms were open to the press and public most of the time. Also, juvenile
detention cells were like a prison. Additionally, McKeiver suggested a finding of
delinquency attached a stigma similar to that of a criminal conviction. Id. at 541-42.
36. Id. at 540-41.
37. Id. at 543.
38. Id. The Court then noted that the application of the fundamental fairness
standard in Gault and Winship resulted in the requirements of notice, counsel,
confrontation, cross-examination, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile
adjudications. Id.
39. Id. The Court observed that while the jury system had many values, the justice
system has been content with use of other methods to find facts. The Court pointed out
that juries were not required in many fact finding proceedings, including equity cases and
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In reaching this conclusion, the McKeiver Court pointed out that the
right to a trial by jury in state criminal proceedings, established in
Duncan v. Louisiana, was not applied retrospectively. 40 If the integrity
of bench trial results was at issue, the McKeiver Court opined that
Duncan would have been applied retrospectively. 41 Moreover, the
McKeiver Court stated that the use of a jury trial in the juvenile system
"would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function, and
would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court's assumed
ability to function in a unique manner."42
The McKeiver Court described the unique features of Pennsylvania's
juvenile justice system by distinguishing it from the adult criminal
system. According to the Court, the distinguishing characteristics
included the following: that the juvenile courts used better diagnostic
and rehabilitative services than their adult counterparts; that a declaration
of delinquency in the juvenile court was significantly less onerous than
a criminal conviction; 43 and that the juvenile system was set up, in
theory, to provide intimate, informal, and protective proceedings that are
aimed at rehabilitation and not punishment. 44 The McKeiver Court
concluded that the addition of a jury trial would transform juvenile
proceedings into fully adversarial proceedings with the traditional delay,
formality, and clamor of the adult criminal system. 45
Based on the points outlined above, the McKeiver Court held, under
the fundamental fairness test, that a right to trial by jury was not

military trials. Id.
40. Id. The McKeiver Court observed:
In Duncan the Court stated, "We would not assert, however, that every
criminal trial-or any particular trial-held before a judge alone is unfair or
that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by
a jury." In DeStefano, for this reason and others, the Court refrained from
retrospective application of Duncan, an action it surely would have not taken
had it felt that the integrity of the result was seriously at issue.
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 547. Although the Court did not find a jury was constitutionally
required, it did observe that "[t]oo often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that
stalwart, protective, and communicating figure the system envisaged." Id. at 544. The
Court cited a study indicating that, at the time, one-half of the judges had not received
undergraduate degrees. Id. at 544 n.4.
43. Id. at 539-40. This observation was actually made by Justice Roberts of the
Pennsylvania court. The McKeiverCourt wrote a two-page summary of Justice Roberts' s
"instructive" opinion. Id. at 538-40.
44. Id. at 544 n.5. The Court observed that a constitutional right to a jury trial in
juvenile proceedings might end the "idealistic prospect ofan intimate, informal protective
proceeding." Id. at 545.
45. Id. at 550.
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constitutionally required in juvenile adjudications. 46 However, the
McKeiver Court also ruled that the states could choose whether to
provide the right to trial by jury in their own juvenile justice systems. 47
California has chosen to deny juveniles the right to a jury trial in the
juvenile court system, even though the California Constitution provides
that "[t]rial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all."48
In the 1924 case of In re Daedler, 49 the California Supreme Court held
that a juvenile had no inherent right to a jury trial under juvenile court
law. The court based its decision on two points. First, after tracing the
origins of the juvenile court system to feudal England, the court cited
several English cases and concluded that no basis for providing a jury
trial for juveniles existed under English common law. 50 Second, the
court stated that an inherent right to a trial by jury existed only in the
penal process. 51 The court observed that the juvenile system, with its
beneficial and merciful terms, was not penal in character. 52 In a more
recent case, the California Supreme Court again characterized the

46. Id at 545. However, the Court's holding seemed somewhat tentative. The
Court stated: "Despite all these disappointments, all these failures, and all these
shortcomings, we conclude that trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is
not a constitutional requirement." Id The Court also suggested if criminal procedures
were required in juvenile court, there would be no need for two different systems. The
Court concluded that "[p]erhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for
the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it." Id at 551.
47. Id at 547. The Court stated that if a "State feels the jury trial is desirable in
all cases, or in certain kinds, there appears to be no impediment to its installing a system
embracing that feature." Id
Although McKeiver appeared to halt the trend of requiring juveniles to be afforded
procedural due process rights in the juvenile justice system, this setback did not last long.
In 1975, the Supreme Court continued expanding the due process requirements associated
with juvenile adjudications by holding the double jeopardy bar applies in juvenile
adjudications. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975). See infra note 225 for a
discussion of this case.
48. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
49. 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924) (14-year-old adjudged a ward of juvenile
court for committing first degree murder).
50. Id at 324-25, 228 P. at 469. In England, under the doctrine ofparens patriae,
the crown had "supreme guardianship and supervision over infants" and the court of
equity had jurisdiction over minors for all matters. Id
51. Id at 326, 228 P. at 469.
52. Id at 332, 228 P. at 472. The Daedler court also noted that a juvenile
adjudication did not equal a criminal prosecution and the juvenile system's goals were
reform and training, not punishment. Id at 326, 228 P. at 469.
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juvenile system as non-penal by describing the system's objectives as
treatment and rehabilitation. 53
The California Supreme Court has not reconsidered the rationale for
denying juveniles the right to trial by jury since its Daedler decision.
However, in the 1984 case of In re Javier A., 54 the Court of Appeal for
the Second District urged the California Supreme Court to reconsider its
prior decision. In Javier A., a juvenile court found that Javier had
committed three counts of attempted murder and had used a firearm. 55
The court stated that Javier had been denied his inviolate right to a trial
by jury that is guaranteed by the California Constitution. 56 The court
determined that Javier had a right to a jury trial based on a prior
California Supreme Court holding. 57 In People v. One 1941 Chevrolet
Coupe, 58 the California Supreme Court held that a person was entitled
to a jury trial in the California courts if the person would have had this
right in England in 1850 (the year California became a state).
After examining the English justice system, the Javier A. court
concluded that the Daedler court erred in finding that juvenile delin53. In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 601 P.2d 549, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1979). But
see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1995) (delinquent minors shall receive
guidance that "may include punishment").
54. 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1984). The court stated:
[W]e ... conclude appellant was denied his "inviolate" right to jury trial under
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. Only because of the
compulsion of Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 20
Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937, do we refrain from reversing and remanding for
a new trial where Javier would enjoy the right to trial by jury. Instead we can
only urge the Supreme Court to reconsider the 60-year-old decision which
upheld the constitutionality of denying jury trials in juvenile proceedings.
Id. at 919, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
In Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held:
"Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are
required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
doctrine of stare dee is is makes no sense. The decisions of this court are binding upon
and must be followed by all the state courts of California." Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937, 939-40, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323-24
(1962).
55. Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d at 920-21, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
56. Id. at 919, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
57. Id. at 929-30, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97 (citing People v. One 1941 Chevrolet
Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283,231 P.2d 832 (1951)).
58. 37 Cal. 2d 283, 286-87, 231 P.2d 832,835 (1951). The test to determine jury
trial rights announced in One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe is:
The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution is the right as it
existed at common law at the time the Constitution was adopted. The common
law at the time the Constitution was adopted includes not only the lex non
scripta but also the written statutes enacted by Parliament. . . . It is
necessary, therefore, to ascertain what was the rule of the English common law
upon this subject in 1850.
Id. (citations omitted).
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quency proceedings were equitable in England in 1850. 59 The Javier
A. court stated that in England, in 1850, a juvenile could not be

adjudged a ward of the court for committing a felony without the right
to a trial by jury. 60 Therefore, the court observed that the California
Constitution guaranteed juveniles who are alleged to have committed
felony offenses the right to a jury trial. 61
The Javier A. court also observed that juvenile proceedings m
California had become increasingly adversarial. The court stated:
Ifwe are correct in our conclusion the California juvenile court system has
now evolved into a specie of "criminal prosecution,:' the right to jury trial
would be guaranteed not only by article I, section 16 of the California
Constitution but by Amendments Six and Fourteen of the United States
Constitution as well. 62

However, constrained by the principle of stare decisis, the Javier A.
court reluctantly held that a juvenile may be denied a right to a trial by
jury in juvenile adjudications. 63 Instead of reversing and remanding the
case, the court could only "urge the Supreme Court" to reconsider the

59. Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d at 950, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
60. Id. at 948, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 410. After a lengthy analysis of English cases and
Parliamentary Acts, the court stated:
We are now in a position to summarize the status of the juvenile
delinquent's right to jury trial in 1850 England. Youngsters charged with a
limited class of minor criminal conduct could be deprived of liberty for a
maximum of three months without a jury trial. But those charged with
felonious conduct (and most lesser criminal acts) were entitled to trial by jury.
Id.

61. Id. at 949, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
62. Id. at 967, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 424. The court reached the conclusion that
juvenile adjudications had become a type of criminal proceeding based on the following
observations. First, the state's sole purpose in administering a juvenile law system was
no longer to act as a guardian in the best interest of the child. The juvenile law also
aimed to protect the public from the children. (California subsequently expanded the
purpose of the juvenile system to include punishment. See supra note 53.) Second, the
Javier A. court noted that juvenile proceedings now required many of the same
procedural safeguards as a criminal trial (i.e., the right to counsel and to cross examine
witnesses). Third, the court observed that a finding of delinquency had become similar
to a criminal conviction. A juvenile was incarcerated and deprived of liberty just like
an adult criminal. Because of these changes the court urged the California Supreme
Court to re-evaluate whether the juvenile adjudications had become criminal proceedings.
Id. at 956-66, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 416-24.
63. The court stated, "Only because of the compulsion of Auto Equity Sales, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937, do we refrain from
reversing and remanding for a new trial ...." Id. at 919, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
See supra note 54 for the holding of Auto Equity Sales, Inc.
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sixty-year-old decision that upheld the constitutionality of denying jury
trials in juvenile proceedings. 64
Despite the Javier A. court's plea, the California Supreme Court has
yet to reconsider a juvenile's right to a jury trial. Consequently, no right
to trial by jury presently exists in the California juvenile justice system.
In addition, the California courts have held that a juvenile cannot waive
the right to treatment in the juvenile justice system in order to obtain the
right to trial by jury at a criminal trial. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal held that a minor's due process and equal protection rights were
not violated when the court denied her waiver of her right to be treated
as a juvenile. 65 The court noted that under section 707 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code, an investigation into a minor's fitness for a
juvenile adjudication commences upon motion of the petitioner. 66 The
petitioner, the court stated, was intended by the legislature to mean the
prosecuting attorney. 67 Thus, only the prosecuting attorney could raise
the fitness issue and, therefore, the minor had no right to opt to be tried
as an adult, thereby gaining the right to a trial by jury.

IL

USE OF JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS IN SENTENCING BEFORE
THREE STRIKES

Before the passage of Three Strikes, prior juvenile adjudications68

64. Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d at 975, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 430. Justice Fieldhouse
agreed with the reasoning and analysis of the majority opinion. However, he dissented
because he believed when significant social and legal changes occur gradually after a
seminal case, courts are not bound to slavishly follow an outdated precedent. Id. at 97576, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
65. In re Anna Marie S., 99 Cal. App. 3d 869, 160 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1979) (Anna
Marie was found to have driven a vehicle without the owner's consent). The court held
that Anna Marie had not been deprived of fundamental due process because she had no
constitutional right to a jury. In addition, her equal protection claim failed. The court
held that a rational basis existed for denying juveniles the right to waive juvenile court
jurisdiction and thereby obtain a criminal trial, even though adults subject to the juvenile
court's jurisdiction can exercise a jurisdictional waiver. The court observed that the state
had a legitimate interest in establishing procedures to rehabilitate juveniles. Id. at
872-73, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98.
66. Id. at 871, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 496-97.
67. Id. at 871-72, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 496-97.
68. Juvenile adjudications, findings of delinquency, and the phrase "adjudged a
ward of the court," for purposes of this Comment, refer to the situation where a juvenile
is found to have violated a law or ordinance by a juvenile court. The California Juvenile
Courts have jurisdiction over anyone under 18 years of age who violates a law or
ordinance and the court may adjudge the person to be a ward of the court. CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995). See infra note 109 for the text of
§ 602.
In contrast, a juvenile conviction refers to a conviction in an adult criminal court.
When a juvenile commits a crime and the juvenile court finds the juvenile is not a fit
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could not be used to enhance69 a sentence in California. In 1982,
Californians amended their Constitution to increase the penalties for
habitual offenders by passing Proposition 8, also known as the California
Victims' Bill of Rights. 70 Part of this proposition mandated that any
prior felony conviction of an adult or juvenile in a criminal proceeding
was to be used to enhance sentences in any subsequent criminal
proceeding. 71 To date, the California Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue of whether a juvenile adjudication counts as a prior felony
conviction for purposes of enhancement under this provision. However,
the California courts of appeal have consistently interpreted the Victims'
Bill of Rights as excluding the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance
adult sentences.
In People v. West, 72 the Court of Appeal for the Third District
considered whether a court could enhance a defendant's sentence based
on two prior juvenile adjudications. At the time, section 667 of the
Penal Code mandated a five-year sentence enhancement for each prior
felony conviction. 73 Therefore, the West court focused on whether the
Victims' Bill of Rights' use of the term "prior juvenile felony conviction" supported the use of a prior juvenile adjudication to enhance the
defendant's sentence under Penal Code section 667.
The West court examined several sections of the Welfare and
Institutions Code to determine the meaning of juvenile felony convictions. The court noted that section 203 of the Code provided that "'[a]n
order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be

and proper subject for juvenile court law, the juvenile court will refer the case to a court
of general jurisdiction. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
69. '"Enhancement' means an additional term of imprisonment added to the base
term." CAL. R. CT. 405(c). '"Base term' is the determinate prison term selected from
among the three possible terms prescribed by statute or the determinate prison term
prescribed by law if a range of three possible terms is not prescribed." CAL. R. CT.
405(b).
70. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f). This clause of the Victims' Bill of Rights
provides: "Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding,
whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of
impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding." Id
71. Id
72. 154 Cal. App. 3d 100, 201 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1984). The court of appeal
considered whether the trial court erred in enhancing the defendant's robbery and assault
charge based on prior juvenile adjudications of criminal misconduct. Id
73. Id at 106, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
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deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding
in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding. "'74 Also, the
court stated that under section 707 .1 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code, a court may certify a juvenile aged sixteen years or older to a
court of criminal jurisdiction. A juvenile tried in criminal court as an
adult might suffer a felony conviction. 75 The West
court harmonized
these provisions with the Victims' Bill of Rights by limiting the
definition of prior juvenile felony convictions to convictions suffered by
a juvenile certified to a criminal court. Accordingly, the West
court held
that juvenile adjudications did not constitute prior felony convictions for
sentence enhancement purposes under section 667 of the Penal Code. 76
Similarly, in In re Anthony R., 77 the Court of Appeal for the Fifth
District considered the use of prior juvenile adjudications in sentencing
under the Victims' Bill of Rights and section 666 of the Penal Code. 78
As in Westt he Anthony R. court rejected the argument that the Victims'
Bill of Rights transformed juvenile court adjudications into criminal
convictions for sentence enhancement purposes. 79 The court stated that
"[w ]e do not believe it was the intent of the drafters of Proposition 8 to
abrogate a linchpin of the Juvenile Court Law-the distinction between
a criminal conviction and a juvenile adjudication."80
74. Id. at 107, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 203).
The juvenile court hears the evidence, makes a finding, and determines the proper
disposition of the case. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 702 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
75. West, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 108, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
76. Id. at 110, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 69. The court also noted it was not questioning
whether the electorate had the power to pass an initiative that required juvenile
adjudications to be used for enhancement purposes. Id.
77. 154 Cal. App. 3d 772, 201 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1984).
78. The court noted that section 666 of the Penal Code at that time stated:
Every person who, having been convicted ofpetit theft, grand theft, burglary,
or robbery and having served a term therefor in any penal institution or having
been imprisoned therein as a condition of probation for such offense, is
subsequently convicted of petit theft, then the person convicted of such
subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year, or in the state prison.
Anthony R., 154 Cal. App. 3d at 774, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300 (quoting CAL. PENAL
CODE § 666) (emphasis added by court).
79. Id. at 775,201 Cal. Rptr. at 300 (Anthony had a prior conviction for petty theft
in juvenile court).
80. Id. at 778, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 302. The California Supreme Court discussed the
distinctions between juvenile adjudications and criminal convictions in a case decided on
November 14, 1983. In re JosephB., 34 Cal. 3d 952,671 P.2d 852, 196 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1983). The court observed that "minors charged with violations of the Juvenile Court
Law are not 'defendants.' They do not 'plead guilty,' but admit the allegations of a
petition." Id. at 955, 671 P.2d at 852, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 350. The court also held that
juvenile adjudications were not criminal convictions. Id. But see In re Kenneth H., 33
Cal. 3d 616,659 P.2d 1156, 189 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1983), discussed infra notes 81-83 and
accompanying text. The court decided Kenneth H on March 24, 1983. Id.
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To date, the California Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
issue of the use of juvenile adjudications to impose sentence enhancements. However, the court did discuss the issue in dictum in the 1983
case of In re Kenneth H. 81 This case involved a statutory provision
that required juvenile courts to declare whether a juvenile's offense
would be a misdemeanor or a felony if the case was tried in a criminal
court. 82 In noting that this declaration had become more significant
because the Victims' Bill of Rights required courts to use prior felony
convictions, but not prior misdemeanor convictions, to enhance
sentences, the California Supreme Court indicated it might condone the
use of juvenile adjudications for sentence enhancement purposes. 83
Although the California courts could not use past juvenile adjudications to enhance criminal sentences, they could use past criminal
convictions of juveniles for sentence enhancement purposes. The Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that a defendant's sentence could be
increased based on his prior criminal conviction at age fifteen in a
Wyoming state court of general jurisdiction. 84 California law at the
time did not allow fifteen-year-olds to be tried in a criminal court. 85
However, the court held that the prior conviction counted for sentence
enhancement purposes because Wyoming had tried the fifteen-year-old
as an adult in a criminal proceeding. The Blakenship court ruled that

81. 33 Cal. 3d 616,659 P.2d 1156, 189 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1983) (case remanded for
a ruling on whether burglary offense was a misdemeanor or felony).
82. The relevant portion of the statute provides: "If the minor is found to have
committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as
a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or
felony." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 702 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
83. KennethH, 33 Cal. 3d at 619 n.3, 659 P.2d at 1158 n.3, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 869
n.3. The California Supreme Court stated: "[T]he potential for prejudice from a finding
offelony status has been increased by passage of Proposition 8, which provides that any
prior felony conviction, whether adult or juvenile, 'shall ... be used without limitation
for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding."'
Id (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(t)).
84. People v. Blakenship, 167 Cal. App. 3d 840, 213 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1985). The
court rejected Blakenship's equal protection challenge and upheld the use of the
Wyoming murder conviction, even though Blakenship was 15 years old at the time of
the offense, because he was tried in a criminal proceeding. Id at 854, 213 Cal. Rptr.
at 675.
85. The California law has changed in this area since Blakenship. California
recently enacted legislation that lowered the age at which juveniles can be tried in a
criminal court from 16 to 14 years old. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§§ 707(d)-(e)
(West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
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the Victims' Bill of Rights applied to all juveniles tried and convicted
as adults. 86 In People v. Jacob, the Court of Appeal for the Second
District also held that a court may enhance a sentence based on a prior
juvenile conviction in a criminal court. 87
While California law did not allow courts to impose an enhancement
based on a prior juvenile adjudication, courts could consider a prior
juvenile adjudication in determining the base term of a sentence. The
California Rules of Court define the base term as "the determinate prison
term selected from among the three possible terms prescribed by statute
or the determinate prison term prescribed by law if a range of three
possible terms is not prescribed."88 An aggravating factor or circumstance may justify the imposition of the upper prison term. 89 Numerous prior convictions, numerous juvenile adjudications, or crimes of
increasing seriousness are all considered aggravating circumstances. 90
However, "[s]election of the upper term is justified only if, after a
consideration of all the relevant facts, the circumstances in aggravation
outweigh the circumstances in mitigation. "91 The California courts
have consistently upheld the consideration of juvenile adjudications as
an aggravating factor under these rules. 92
In addition to considering a juvenile adjudication as an aggravating
circumstance, the activity underlying the juvenile adjudication may also
be considered in determining whether to impose the death penalty under
Penal Code section 190.3, subdivision (b). 93 This provision directs the
86. Blakenship, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 674. The court noted
that the Victims' Bill of Rights did not exempt juveniles who were convicted in criminal
courts in foreign jurisdictions. Id.
87. People v. Jacob, 174 Cal. App. 3d 1166, 220 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1985) (holding
that the accused's prior conviction as a juvenile counted, even though expunged when
the accused received an honorable discharge from California Youth Authority, because
the accused was tried as an adult).
88. CAL. R. CT. 405(b).
89. "'Aggravation' or 'circumstances in aggravation' means facts which justify the
imposition of the upper prison term ...." CAL. R. CT. 405( d).
90. "Circumstances in aggravation include: ... The defendant's prior convictions
as an adult or sustained petitions injuvenile delinquency proceedings [that] are numerous
or of increasing seriousness." CAL. R. CT. 42l(b)(2).
91. CAL. R. CT. 420(b).
92. See People v. Ramos, 106 Cal. App. 3d 591, 609, 165 Cal. Rptr. 179, 189-90
(1980) (upholding the imposition of the upper term where defendant had two juvenile
adjudications for possession of alcoholic beverages in a car and prior adult convictions
for petty theft and driving without a license); People v. Berry, 117 Cal. App. 3d 184,
172 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1981) (holding that consideration ofa prior juvenile adjudication as
an aggravating factor did not violate due process); People v. Hubbell, 108 Cal. App. 3d
253, 258, 166 Cal. Rptr. 466, 469 (1980) (recognizing that although the purpose of the
juvenile system is to reform, the subsequent use of a juvenile adjudication as an
aggravating factor is constitutionally permissible and statutorily required).
93. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
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fact finder to consider "[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by
the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or
violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence" in
determining the penalty. 94 In considering the use of juvenile adjudications under this provision, the California Supreme Court noted that the
settled law is "that any criminal activity involving force or violence
comes within the purview of section 190.3, factor (b ), irrespective of the
offender's age" or the fact that the juvenile was adjudged a ward of the
court. 95 The court acknowledged Welfare and Institutions Code section
203 's proscription on the use of juvenile adjudications as criminal
convictions for any purpose, but the court asserted that under Penal Code
section 190.3 the relevant fact is the underlying conduct, not the
resulting adjudication. 96
In summary, before the passage of Three Strikes, juvenile adjudications were not used to enhance sentences. If a juvenile was convicted
in a criminal proceeding, the prior conviction could be used to enhance
a current sentence. While the sentencing court could not impose an
enhancement based on prior juvenile adjudications, the court could
consider prior juvenile adjudications as an aggravating factor in
determining whether to impose the upper term of a determinate sentence.
Additionally, fact finders could consider the conduct underlying a
juvenile adjudication in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.
III.

THE USE OF JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS IN SENTENCING UNDER
THE THREE STRIKES LAWS

In passing the Three Strikes provisions, the legislature and voters'
stated intent was to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishments for repeat felons. 97 The Three Strikes provisions in sections 667

94. Id
95. People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 687, 809 P.2d 351, 393, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692,
734 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1062 (1992).
96. Id
97. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(b), 1170.12 (West Supp. 1995). Section 667(b)
declares: "It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive,
to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony
and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1995).
The historical and statutory notes of§ 1170.12 indicate that the following statement
preceded the text of this section in Proposition 184: "It is the intent of the People of the
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and 1170.12 of the Penal Code are similar in many respects. Each
provides the same general sentencing guidelines and definitions of prior
offenses that count as strikes. 98 Both Three Strikes provisions also
expressly provide that a juvenile adjudication constitutes a felony
conviction when four conditions exist. 99
First, the person must have committed the prior offense when he or
she was sixteen years of age or older. 100 Second, the offense must be
listed in section 707(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, 101 listed
State of California in enacting this measure to ensure longer prison sentences and greater
punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of
serious and/or violent felony offenses." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp.
1995).
98. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(c)-(d), 1170.12(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1995).
99. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(d)(3), 1170.12(b)(3) (West Supp. 1995). These
provisions are essentially the same. Section 667(d)(3) specifically states:
A prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior felony conviction for
purposes of sentence enhancement if:
(A) The juvenile was 16 years of age or older at the time he or she
committed the prior offense.
(B) The prior offense is listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code or described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony.
(C) The juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under the juvenile court law.
(D) The juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the
meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because the
person committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (West Supp. 1995).
100. Both statutes require that "[t]he juvenile was 16 years of age or older at the
time he or she committed the prior offense." CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)(3)(A),
1170.12(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
101. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(d)(3)(B), 1170.12(b)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1995).
The following offenses are listed in§ 707(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code and
count as strikes:
(1) Murder.
(2) Arson [of an inhabited structure or property].
(3) Robbery while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon.
(4) Rape with force or violence or threat of great bodily harm.
(5) Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm.
(6) Lewd or lascivious act as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 288 of the
Penal Code.
(7) Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily
harm.
(8) Any offense specified in ... Section 289 of the Penal Code.
(9) Kidnapping for ransom.
(10) Kidnapping for purpose of robbery.
(11) Kidnapping with bodily harm.
(12) Attempted murder.
(13) Assault with a firearm or destructive device.
(14) Assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.
(15) Discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building.
(16) Any offense described in Section 1203.09 of the Penal Code.
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as a "violent" felony in section 667.5 of the Penal Code, 102 or listed

(17) Any offense described in Section 12022.5 of the Penal Code.
(18) Any felony offense in which the minor personally used a weapon listed
in subdivision (a) of Section 12020 of the Penal Code.
(19) Any felony offense described in Section 136.1 or 137 of the Penal Code.
(20) Manufacturing, compounding, or selling one-half ounce or more of any
salt or solution ofa controlled substance specified in subdivision (e) of Section
11055 of the Health and Safety Code.
(21) Any violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the
Penal Code, which would also constitute a felony violation of subdivision (b)
of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code.
(22) Escape, by the use of force or violence, from any county juvenile hall,
home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp in violation of subdivision (b) of Section
871 where great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted upon an employee of
the juvenile facility during the commission of the escape.
(23) Torture as described in Sections 206 and 206.1 of the Penal Code.
(24) Aggravated mayhem, as described in Section 205 of the Penal Code.
(25) Carjacking, as described in Section 215 of the Penal Code, while armed
with a dangerous or deadly weapon.
(26) Kidnapping, as punishable in subdivision (d) of Section 208 of the Penal
Code.
(27) Kidnapping, as punishable in Section 209.5 of the Penal Code.
(28) The offense described in subdivision (c) of Section 12034 of the Penal
Code.
·
(29) The offense described in Section 12308 of the Penal Code.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
102. Section 667.5 of the Penal Code lists the following offenses as violent felonies:
(1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter.
(2) Mayhem.
(3) Rape as defined in paragraph (2) or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 261
or paragraph (1) or (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 262.
(4) Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(5) Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(6) Lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years as defined in Section 288.
(7) Any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life.
(8) Any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any
person other than an accomplice which has been charged and proved as
provided for in Section 12022.7 or 12022.9 on or after July 1, 1977, or as
specified prior to July I, 1977, in Sections 213, 264, and 461, or any felony
in which the defendant uses a firearm which use has been charged and proved
as provided in Section 12022.5 or 12022.55.
(9) Any robbery perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house, vessel, as defined
in Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, which is inhabited and
designed for habitation, an inhabited floating home as defined in subdivision
(d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, an inhabited trailer
coach, as defined in the Vehicle Code, or in the inhabited portion of any other
building, wherein it is charged and proved that the defendant personally used
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as a "serious" felony m section 1192. 7 103 of the Penal Code. 104

a deadly or dangerous weapon, as provided in subdivision (b) of Section
12022, in the commission of that robbery.
(10) Arson in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 451.
(11) The offense defined in subdivision (a) of Section 289 where the act is
accomplished against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or
fear ofimmediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(12) Attempted murder.
(13) A violation of Section 12308.
(14) Kidnapping, in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 207.
(15) Kidnapping, as punished in subdivision (b) of Section 208.
(16) Continuous sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Section 288.5.
(17) Carjacking, as. defined in subdivision (a) of Section 215, if it ischarged
and proved that the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon
as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 12022 in the commission of the
carjacking.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
103. The following crimes are listed as serious offenses in§ 1192.7(c) of the Penal
Code and count as strikes under the Three Strikes provisions:
(1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by
force, violence, duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (5) oral
copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person;
(6) lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years; (7) any felony
punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life; (8) any other
felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any
person, other than an accomplice, or any felony in which the defendant
personally uses a firearm; (9) attempted murder; (10) assault with intent to
commit rape or robbery; (11) assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on
a peace officer; (12) assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate; (13) assault
with a deadly weapon by an inmate; (14) arson; (15) exploding a destructive
device or any explosive with intent to injure; (I 6) exploding a destructive
device or any explosive causing great bodily injury or mayhem; (17) exploding
a destructive device or any explosive with intent to murder; ( 18) burglary of
an inhabited dwelling house, or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code,
or inhabited portion of any other building; ( 19) robbery or bank robbery; (20)
kidnapping; (21) holding of a hostage by a person confined in a state prison;
(22) attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the
state prison for life; (23) any felony in which the defendant personally used a
dangerous or deadly weapon; (24) selling, furnishing, administering, giving, or
offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give to a minor any heroin, cocaine,
phencyclidine (PCP), or any methamphetamine-related drug, as described in
paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 11055 of the Health and Safety
Code, or any of the precursors of methamphetamines, as described in
subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (f) of Section 11055 or
subdivision (a) of Section 11100 of the Health and Safety Code; (25) any
violation of subdivision (a) of Section 289 where the act is accomplished
against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (26)
grand theft involving a firearm; (27) carjacking; any attempt to commit a crime
listed in this subdivision other than an assault; and (20) any conspiracy to
commit an offense described in paragraph (24) as it applies to Section 11370.4
ofthe Health and Safety Code where the defendant conspirator was substantial-
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While the Penal Code offense lists largely overlap with the Welfare and
Institutions Code list, a few offenses appear only in the Welfare and
Institutions Code 105 and some appear only in the Penal Code. 106
Third, the juvenile court must have found the juvenile to be a ''fit and
proper subject" for the juvenile justice system. 107 Subdivision (c) of
section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code outlines the standard
and procedure used to decide if a juvenile is "fit and proper." Under
section 707, if a juvenile aged sixteen years or older allegedly commits
a crime listed within section 707, the petitioner may move for a fitness
investigation. A juvenile alleged to have committed an offense listed in
subdivision (b) of section 707, is presumed to be "unfit." The court then
assigns a probation officer to investigate the juvenile's behavior and
social history and the officer forwards the report to the judge. The
juvenile and the petitioner may also submit evidence to the court. Next,
the court evaluates all the evidence and determines whether the
ly involved in the planning, direction, or financing of the underlying offense.
CAL. PENAL CODE § l 192.7(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)(3)(C), l 170.12(b)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1995).
Ironically, both provisions limit strike offenses to those listed in the referenced section
as of June 30, 1993. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(h), 1170.12 (West Supp. 1995)
( accompanying historical and statutory notes). Thus, offenses added after June 30, 1993,
like carjacking (CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667.5(c)(l7), 1192.7(c)(27) (West Supp. 1995);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 707(b)(25) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995)), arguably do not
count as strike offenses for future sentencing. However, given that the purpose of Three
Strikes is to increase penalties for habitual offenders who have committed serious or
violent felonies in the past, a court would likely hold this was merely a drafting error.
See People v. Pieters, 52 Cal. 3d 894, 898-99, 802 P.2d 420, 422-23, 276 Cal. Rptr. 918,
920 (1991) (noting the literal meaning of a statute shall not be given effect when doing
so would result in absurd consequences that were not intended by the legislature). See
supra note 97 for the text setting forth the purpose of Three Strikes.
105. For example, selling a controlled substance to a minor is a strike offense for
both minors and adults. However, selling a controlled substance to an adult is only a
strike offense if committed by a minor. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 707(b)(20)
(West 1984 & Supp. 1995) (which lists "[m]anufacturing, compounding, or selling onehalf ounce or more of any salt or solution of a controlled substance" as an offense
without specifying whether the intended buyer or seller is a juvenile or adult). See supra
note 101. Cf CAL. PENAL CODE § l 192.7(c)(24) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (which
defines a serious felony as "selling, furnishing, administering, giving, or offering to sell,
furnish, administer, or give to a minor any heroin, cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), or any
methamphetamine-related drug.") (emphasis added). See supra note 103.
106. Burglary of an inhabited building appears in subdivision (c)(18) of§ 1192.7
of the Penal Code but not in subdivision (b) of § 707 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code. See supra note 103 for text of subdivision (c)(18) of§ 1192.7 of the Penal Code.
107. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(d)(3), 1170.12(b)(3)(WestSupp.1995). See supra
note 99 for text of these sections.
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presumption of unfitness has been rebutted. If the court finds the
juvenile would be amenable to rehabilitation, he or she is deemed a ''fit
and proper" subject for the juvenile court. 108
Finally, the Three Strikes provisions also require that the juvenile was
"adjudged a ward of the juvenile court ... because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of section 707 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code." 109 This provision arguably limits the offenses that
count as strikes to those listed in section 707(b) of the Welfare and
Institutions Code for the reasons stated below.
Under Three Strikes, a juvenile adjudication must meet all four of the
criteria listed above to count as a felony conviction. Many strike
offenses appear in the Penal Code sections and section 707(b) of the
Welfare and Institutions Code. However, several offenses appear only
in the Penal Code sections. 110 Thus, if a juvenile committed a Penal
Code only offense, such as robbery of an inhabited building, the juvenile
would obviously not have been "adjudged a ward of the court" for
committing "an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code."111 Therefore, only juvenile adjudications for offenses delineated in section 707(b) of the Welfare and
Institutions Code should count as strikes. 112 Because juveniles who
commit section 707(b) offenses are presumed "unfit," only juveniles who

108. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 707(c) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995). The criteria
considered in evaluating the minor's fitness include:
(1) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.
(2) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court's jurisdiction.
(3) The minor's previous delinquent history.
(4) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the
minor.
(5) The circumstances and gravity of the offenses alleged in the petition to
have been committed by the minor.
Id
109. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)(3)(D), 1170.12(b)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1995).
Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this
state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely
on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such
person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
110. These offenses include voluntary manslaughter and robbery of an inhabited
dwelling. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.5(c), l 192.7(c) (West Supp. 1995).
111. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)(3)(D), ll 70.12(b)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1995).
112. Alex Ricciardulli, Three-Strikes, and You 're Out!, FORUM, June 1994, at 110,
111.
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overcome this presumption and are found to be "fit and proper" will
have their prior juvenile adjudications count under Three Strikes. 113
An interpretation of Three Strikes that limits the strike offenses to
those listed in the pertinent part of the Welfare and Institutions Code is
consistent with the rules of statutory construction. First, the court's
primary duty in interpreting a statute is to determine the lawmaker's
intent. 114 The language of the provisions and the official ballot are
considered "indicia" of the voters' intent. 113 The legislative analysts'
analysis of Proposition 184 (Penal Code section 1170.12), published in
the California Ballot Pamphlet, stated that "specified crimes committed
by a minor ... count as a previous conviction" and "[t]hese specified
crimes generally include the same crimes defined as serious and violent
felonies." 116 Because the offenses listed in Section 707(b) of the
Welfare and Institutions Code overlap with or "generally include" the
"violent" and "serious" offenses listed in Penal Code sections 667.5 and
1192.7, the ballot pamphlet and text of Penal Code section 1170.12
support an inference that the voters intended only those crimes listed in
section 707(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code to count as juvenile
strike offenses. Second, the courts have repeatedly held that when a
statute can reasonably be interpreted in two different ways, the court

113. Albert J. Menaster, the deputy in charge of the appellate branch of the Los
Angeles County Public Defender's Office, asserts that defense counsel "should argue that
an express finding of fitness is required to trigger this statute." Albert J. Menaster, 18
Ways to Avoid 3 Strikes,FORUM, June 1994, at 102, 107. Menaster also noted that the
Los Angeles District Attorney's policy is to file a strike prior even in the absence of an
express finding of fitness. He stated that this policy "simply ignores the portion of the
statute requiring the minor to have been found fit by the juvenile court." Id
It should also be noted that if a juvenile fails to rebut the presumption that he or she
is not a fit and proper subject for juvenile court, the juvenile will be certified to a court
of general jurisdiction where he or she may suffer a felony conviction. If this juvenile
suffers a conviction for a serious or violent felony, this conviction would count as a
strike under Three Strikes. Of course, if the juvenile is tried in a court of general
jurisdiction, the juvenile will receive the same full panoply of rights an adult is afforded.
Thus, the issues discussed in this Comment would not arise ..
114. People v. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th 1142, 1146, 857 P.2d 1163, 1164, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d
753, 754 (1993).
115. When a proposition is ambiguous, the court may also consider the analysis and
arguments in the ballot pamphlet as indicia of the voters' intent. Legislature v. Eu, 54
Cal. 3d 492, 504, 816 P.2d 1309, 1315, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283,289 (1991).
116. LEGIS. ANALYST, CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 184,
GEN. ELECTION 33 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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must use the construction that favors the accused. 117 An interpretation
of the Three Strikes provisions limiting the list of juvenile strike
offenses to those in the Welfare and Institutions Code would favor the
accused.
One could argue that the courts should interpret the Three Strikes
statutes as including the Penal Code offenses as juvenile priors because
excluding Penal Code offenses as juvenile priors would render the
references to the Penal Code in these parts of the statutes meaningless.
Both Three Strikes provisions expressly state that a prior juvenile
adjudication constitutes a felony for sentencing purposes if the offense
was one listed as ''violent" or "serious" within the Penal Code provisions. 118 The courts have held that, if possible, effect should be given
to every word of a statute that defines an offense. 119 However,
interpreting these statutes in that manner requires the courts to ignore the
words in the statutes that mandate the person be adjudged a ward of the
juvenile court because of the commission of a Welfare and Institutions
Code section 707(b) offense. Both interpretations result in superfluous
words. Limiting the list of juvenile strike offenses is, however,
consistent with the voters' intent. Accordingly, only prior juvenile
adjudications for offenses listed in section 707(b) of the Welfare and
Institutions Code should count as prior felony convictions under Three
Strikes.
If a juvenile adjudication satisfies the requirements under Three
Strikes, the court must count the adjudication as a prior strike. Both
Three Strikes provisions require the sentence for the current felony
conviction to be doubled when a defendant has one prior juvenile

117. See, e.g., People v. Fenton, 20 Cal. App. 4th 965, 968, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 52,
54 (1993) ("Ordinarily penal statutes are construed most favorably to the defendant.");
People v. Jones, 155 Cal. App. 3d 153, 202 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984) (holding defendant
shall receive benefit of the doubt in interpreting and constructing statutory language).
118. Penal Code § 667(d)(3)(B) provides:
A prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior felony conviction for
sentence enhancement if ... [t]he prior offense is listed in subdivision (b) of
Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or described in paragraph (1)
[which references violent felonies in section 667.5 and serious felonies in
section 1192.7) ... as a felony.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1995). Section l l 70.12(b)(3)(B) of the
Penal Code is essentially identical.
119. In re Philpott, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1152, 1156, 210 Cal. Rptr. 95, 97 (1985).
The court observed "the well-established rule of statutory construction that significance
should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the
legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage should be avoided."

Id
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adjudication (a strike two situation). 120 However, the provisions differ
significantly in a strike three situation. Section 667 of the Penal Code
counts prior juvenile adjudications as strikes to enhance a sentence to
twenty-five years to life. 121 Conversely, the language of section
1170.12 of the Penal Code appears to exclude juvenile adjudications in
a strike three situation. 122 Whether juvenile adjudications count in the
strike three situation depends in part on whether the courts interpret the
statutes as coexisting. 123
If the statutes are interpreted as coexisting, then arguably a prosecutor
could charge a defendant under either Three Strikes provision.
However, the rules of statutory construction provide that when parts of
the code conflict, the latest enacted section governs. 124 If a court
interprets the statutes literally, the strike three provision of section
1170.12 would be deemed "the law". on this point because it conflicts
with section 667 and was enacted after section 667. In addition, the
courts have also held that when ambiguity exists, statutes must be
construed most favorably to the accused. 125 Not counting a juvenile
adjudication in a strike three situation, as section 1170.12 provides,
obviously favors the accused.
The courts may reject the notion that the two statutes are coexisting
because section 1170.12 of the Penal Code, 126 which was passed after
section 667, 127 includes the statement, "[n]otwithstanding any other

120. See supra note 99 for the text of the Three Strikes provisions regarding
juvenile adjudications.
121. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(e)(2) (West Supp. 1995). See supra note 12 for text.
122. CAL. PENAL CODE§ ll 70.12(c)(2)(West Supp. 1995). Note that this section,
unlike§ 667, also excludes convictions in another jurisdiction in the two strike situation.
See supra note 12 for text.
123. Beth F. Holzman, Proposition 184: Will It Restrict 'Three Strikes' Sentencing
to Defendants With Two Prior Serious/ViolentFeloniesCommitted by Adults (or Persons
Tried as Adults) in California?, CAL. CRIM. DEF. PRAC. REP., Nov. 1994, at 416-17.
124. People v. Oppenheimer, 42 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 4, 7 n.2, 116 Cal. Rptr. 795,
797 n.2 (1974) ("In accordance with ordinary principles of statutory construction we
must read all of the sections of the Penal Code together, give effect in case of conflict
to the latest enacted sections ....").
125. See supra note 117.
126. Approved by voters on Nov. 8, 1994. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1170.12 (West
Supp. 1995).
127. Approved by the Governor on Mar. 7, 1994. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667 (West
Supp. 1995).
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prov1s1ons of law." 128 This language suggests that section 1170.12
supersedes section 667. Under this interpretation, juvenile adjudications
would not count as strikes in the strike three situation per the plain
language of subdivision (c)(2)(A) of section 1170.12. Moreover,
because the language of this portion of section 1170.12 is clear and
unambiguous, analysis of the ballot pamphlet to discern the voters' intent
is arguably unnecessary. 129
Les Kleinberg, the counsel to the Senate Criminal Procedure
Committee, observed that "[s]ince the initiative is clearly different from
the bill, the people's intent was for the changes to be there." 130
Despite these two arguments in favor of juvenile adjudications not
counting in the strike three situation under section 1170.12, the courts
have not yet addressed this issue. However, a California court of appeal
held that an out-of-state conviction, which like a juvenile adjudication
appears to be excluded from strike three situations under section
1170.12, could be used in a strike three situation. 131 In People v.

128. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1170.12(a) (WestSupp.1995). Assembly Bill 971, which
amended§ 667, was written after Proposition 184, which added§ 1170.12. These two
laws were supposedly identical and Proposition 184 was to be passed first. Drafters of
Assembly Bill 971 apparently deleted the limiting language regarding juvenile
adjudications to presumably expand the reach of the law. Holzman, supra note 123, at
416.
129. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 504, 816 P.2d 1309, 1315, 286 Cal. Rptr.
283, 289 (1991) (discussion on statutory analysis). See supra note 12 for the text of the
statutes; see also People v. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th 1142, 1146, 857 P.2d 1163, 1164, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 753, 754 (1993). In construing Proposition 8, the California Supreme Court
observed:
We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the
lawmakers' intent. In the case of a constitutional provision adopted by the
voters, their intent governs. To determine intent, "The court turns first to the
words themselves for the answer .... If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of
the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the
case of a provision adopted by the voters)."
Id. (quoting Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 798, 789 P.2d 934, 940, 268
Cal. Rptr. 753, 759) (1990)) (citations omitted).
130. Hallye Jordan, Prop. 184 May Water Down 'Three Strikes, 'L.A. DAILY J.,
Oct. 21, 1994, at 1, 8.
131. See People v. Jones, 40 Cal. App. 4th 630, 632, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 309
( 1995). Jones' s current convictions were for six counts of rape, three counts of assault
with force likely to produce great bodily injury, one count of first degree burglary, one
count of false imprisonment, and one count of sodomy by force. Id. at 632 n.1, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 309 n.1. Additionally, Jones admitted to five prior felony convictions, which
included an Arizona robbery conviction. Id. at 631, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309.
Out-of-state prior convictions are described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) in
§ 1170.12 of the Penal Code. Subdivision ( c)(2)(A) of Penal Code § 1170.12 requires
imposition of a 25-year-to-life sentence if the person has two or more prior felony
convictions as defined by paragraph (1). CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1170.12 (West Supp.
1995). See supra note 12 for the text of this provision.
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Jones, the defendant argued that the language of section 1170.12
required exclusion of his Arizona conviction. 132 In rejecting Jones 's
contention, the court stated that "the difference in the wording of the
initiative version is the result of a drafting error and does not indicate an
intent to produce sentences that are any less severe than under the earlier
legislative version." 133 The court observed that the ballot pamphlet
conclusively showed that the voters did not intend the initiative to
weaken the legislative version of Three Strikes. 134 Additionally,
Jones's version, the court opined, would lead to absurd results because
it would undermine the initiative's stated purpose of keeping habitual
criminals behind bars and directly contradict the ballot pamphlet's
statement that the initiative does not alter the law. 135
The Jones court's interpretation of which prior convictions count as
strikes in a strike three situation is more persuasive. The voters' clearly
stated intent in Proposition 184 was to increase the sentences of
recidivists. This stated purpose would be frustrated if out-of-state and
juvenile adjudications were not counted as strikes in a strike three
situation. While the language on this issue is different from the
legislative version of Three Strikes, in view of the stated purpose of

132.

Although Jones was convicted under the legislative version of Three Strikes,

§ 667 of the Penal Code, he argued that the initiative version was more lenient and,
therefore, should be applied retroactively, citing In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 408 P.2d

948, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965), as authority. Jones, 40 Cal. App. 4th at 633, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 310.
133. Id at 632, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309. The court later stated that "[t]he
underlying intent is so clear that it will prevail over an inexplicable drafting error." Id
at 635, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311.
134. Id at 634, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310. The ballot pamphlet stated that the
initiative was identical to the legislative version of the law and merely reaffirmed the
already existing law. Additionally, the pamphlet stated that out-of-state felonies were
counted as strikes. Id
135. Id at 635, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310-11. Because the court found the initiative
was not more lenient than the legislative version, the court held it was not retrospective.
Id
In addition to the absurd results that the court observed Jones' s version of§ 1170.12
would yield, this interpretation also sets up a potential Equal Protection Clause challenge.
A person with two prior California convictions for armed robbery would be sentenced
to 25 years to life for the current armed robbery conviction. However, a person with
two prior Arizona convictions for armed robbery or two prior juvenile adjudications for
this crime would not be subject to a 25-year-to-life sentence if convicted of the current
armed robbery charge. Accordingly, similarly situated people would be treated
differently under this interpretation of§ 1170.12.
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Proposition 184, this difference was more likely the result of a drafting
error than an intentional change by the voters.
Regardless of whether a juvenile adjudication counts as a strike in the
strike three situation, the use of juvenile adjudications in sentencing by
the Three Strikes laws marks a significant change in California law.
Three Strikes has been deemed "a parallel sentencing scheme for
specifically described recidivists." 136 The courts have rejected the
argument that doubling or tripling a sentence under Three Strikes
constitutes an enhancement. 137 An enhancement is an addition to the
base term. Three Strikes changes the base term for recidivists. Hence,
the pre-Three Strikes prohibition on the use of juvenile adjudications to
enhance sentences is presumably still in place.
However, the pre-Three Strikes use of juvenile adjudications as an
aggravating factor in sentencing is significantly different from the use of
juvenile adjudications under Three Strikes. In the first situation, the
existence of a prior juvenile adjudications is a factor that is weighed
with other aggravating and mitigating factors. Thus, the mere existence
of a prior juvenile adjudication does not necessarily result in the
imposition of an upper term. 138 Additionally, under the California
Rules of Court, a single juvenile adjudication alone does not justify the
imposition of the upper term. 139 In contrast, under Three Strikes, the
existence of one qualifying prior juvenile adjudication requires the court
to double the sentence for the current offense, regardless of the existence
of mitigating factors.
The use of a juvenile adjudication under Three Strikes also differs
significantly from the pre-Three Strikes use of juvenile adjudications in
death penalty sentencing. Before Three Strikes, the jury could consider
the behavior underlying a juvenile adjudication when determining
whether to impose the death penalty. The mere existence of a juvenile
adjudication did not, however, mandate imposition of the death penalty.
In contrast, under Three Strikes, the existence of a qualifying juvenile
adjudication results in an automatic sentence increase. Accordingly,
Three Strikes' non-discretionary, automatic use of juvenile adjudications
to enlarge sentences constitutes a significant change in California law.

136. People v. Anderson, 35 Cal. App. 4th 587, 595, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474, 478
(1995).
137. Id. The interpretation of Three Strikes as "a parallel sentencing scheme" for
recidivists enables the court to double (or triple) a life sentence based on one prior
conviction and impose an enhancement based on the same prior conviction. Id.
138. See supra notes 68-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pre-Three
Strikes use of juvenile adjudications in sentencing.
139. CAL. R. CT. 421(b)(2). See supra note 90 for statement of this rule.
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IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF JUVENILE
ADJUDICATIONS UNDER THREE STRIKES

While the rules of statutory construction suggest that prior juvenile
adjudications must be used to increase sentences under Three
Strikes, 140 these provisions obviously cannot be enforced if they are
unconstitutional. The primary constitutional challenges to the use of
juvenile adjudications under Three Strikes involve the violation of due
process and equal protection rights.

A.

Due Process Challenges to the Use of Juvenile Adjudications
Under Three Strikes

Denying a juvenile the right to a jury trial in the juvenile court has
been deemed constitutional by the United States Supreme Court because
of the fundamental differences between the purposes of the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. 141 However, it is unclear whether the subsequent use of a juvenile adjudication to increase the punishment for a
current felony conviction under Three Strikes violates the Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 15 of the California Constitution. 142
In People v. Peterson, 143 the Court of Appeal for the Second District

140. Unlike the ambiguous use ofthe term "juvenile conviction" in the Victims' Bill
of Rights, Three Strikes clearly articulates when juvenile adjudications count as felony
convictions. Penal Code statutes must "be construed according to the fair import of their
terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice." CAL. PENAL CODE § 4
(West 1988 & Supp. 1995). Therefore, juvenile adjudications must be counted for
sentence enhancement purposes as a matter of statutory construction.
141. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). See supra notes 35-47
and accompanying text for a discussion of the McKeiver decision.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process oflaw"); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("Persons
may not ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.").
143. 40 Cal. App. 4th 1479, 1483, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318,319 (1995). Peterson's
current conviction was for kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking. Id at
1483, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318. Additionally, the jury found Peterson had used a firearm
during the commission of this offense. Id Peterson had a prior juvenile adjudication
for robbery and was found to have used a dangerous weapon during the robbery. Id at
1482 n.1, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318 n.1. Three Strikes required Peterson's sentence to be
doubled based on the prior juvenile adjudication, making him eligible for parole in 14
years instead of seven. Id at 1483, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318.
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considered whether the use of juvenile adjudications to enlarge adult
sentences under Three Strikes violated due process. In concluding that
it did not, the court observed that the use of juvenile adjudications to
increase adult sentences had been upheld against due process challenges
under pre-Three Strikes California case law, as well as in the case law
of other state and the federal courts. 144 The Peterson court opined that
the rationale that led these courts to approve of the use of juvenile
adjudications in sentencing also applied to Three Strikes. 145 The court
then noted that it is constitutionally permissible to deny juveniles certain
rights that adults possess, such as a right to a jury trial, because of the
fundamentally different purposes of the juvenile and criminal justice
systems. 146 "'If it does not violate due process for a juvenile to be
deprived of his or her liberty without a jury trial, we fail to find a
violation of due process when a later deprivation of liberty is enhanced

Peterson challenged the constitutionality of the juvenile adjudication provisions of
Three Strikes. Id. at 1482, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318. The trial court denied Peterson's
motion, but still struck the prior juvenile adjudication in the interest of justice or
alternatively because the use of the juvenile adjudication to double Peterson's sentence
ran afoul of the federal and state constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 1482-83, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318.
The People appealed the ruling, asserting the trial court ignored the clear intent of the
law and, therefore, imposed an unlawful sentence. Id. at 1483, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318.
In addition to ruling on the due process and equal protection challenges to the use of
juvenile adjudications, the court of appeal held that Proposition 184, which enacted
§ 1170.12, did not grant the trial court power to strike an alleged prior conviction in the
interests of justice. Id. at 1489, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323. The court further held that the
use of a juvenile adjudication to double Peterson's sentence did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment because the penalty was not grossly disproportionate to the offense.
Id at 1490-91, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324.
144. Id. at 1483, 1485-86, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319, 320-21. Although juvenile
adjudications have been considered as sentencing factors in California, the use ofjuvenile
adjudications under Three Strikes marks a significant change in the law. See supra notes
136-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of this change.
145. Peterson, 40 Cal. App. 4th at 1486, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 321.
146. Id. Although the Petersoncourt noted that the differences in the two systems
justify a lower due process standard in juvenile court, it is unclear whether these
distinctions still exist in California. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975)
(noting the similar potential consequences of adjudicatory and criminal hearings in
California); In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 919,967,206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 424 (1984).
See supra note 62 for a discussion of this section of the Javier A. opinion. With Three
Strikes, the consequences of criminal convictions and juvenile adjudications are even
more similar as both may be used to double a life sentence. See also Martha ElinBlomquist & Martin L. Forst, Moral and Practical Problems with Redefining the Goal
of the Juvenile Justice System as Accountability, 14 J. Juv. L. 26, 28-46 (1993), for a
summary of the history of California's juvenile justice system and current trends. The
authors conclude the injection of the concept of accountability into the system
jeopardizes the concept of a separate juvenile system. Id. at 46.
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due to this juvenile adjudication. "' 147 The court also stated that the
punishment under a recidivist statute is for the current offense. 148
Moreover, findings of delinquency are made only after a judge is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that allegations of the petition are
true. 149 Therefore, the court concluded that a juvenile adjudication
"represents a fair means of establishing a defendant's criminal propensity."150

As noted by the Peterson court, the federal courts have approved of
the use of prior juvenile adjudications to increase adult sentences under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Under the federal guidelines, a
sentencing judge calculates the defendant's criminal history score based
on past convictions and adjudications. The judge uses this score to
sentence the person for the current offense. These guidelines require
courts to add points to a defendant's score when a prior juvenile
adjudication exists. 151
The District of Columbia Circuit recently upheld the use of juvenile
adjudications in calculating sentences under the sentencing guidelines in
United States v. Johnson. 152 In Johnson, the defendant argued that a
juvenile adjudication was not a criminal conviction and, therefore,
should not be used to increase his sentence. 153 The court recognized

147. Peterson,40 Cal. App. 4th at 1486-87, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322 (quoting United
States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1989)).
148. Id. at 1487, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4Al.2(d) (West 1994). This section
provides:
(d) Offenses Committed Prior to Age Eighteen
(I) If the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of
imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, add 3 points under
§ 4Al.l(a) for each such sentence.
(2) In any other case,
(A) add 2 points under § 4Al.l(b) for each adult or juvenile sentence to
confinement of at least sixty days if the defendant was released from such
confinement within five years ofhis commencement ofthe instant offense;
(B) add 1 point under § 4Al.l(c) for each adult or juvenile sentence
imposed within five years of the defendant's commencement of the instant
offense not covered in (A).
Id.
152. 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Johnson was convicted of possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, Johnson was awarded
IO points, nine of which were based on his juvenile record. Id. at 153.
153. Id. at 154.
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that juvenile justice systems emphasize rehabilitation and treatment.
However, the court stated that a juvenile offender turned recidivist loses
the benefits of the juvenile system because of society's stronger interest
in punishing habitual criminals. 154 The court also noted that there is
a long-standing tradition of using juvenile adjudications in calculating
sentences. 155 Other courts have similarly upheld the use of juvenile
adjudications under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 156
While Peterson and the federal courts have upheld the use of juvenile
adjudications to increase adult sentences, one could argue that these
holdings were based on a misunderstanding of the premises underlying
McKeiver. 157 The Supreme Court allowed differential treatment of
juveniles in McKeiver because the Court assumed that the juvenile
adjudication would be used for a treatment purpose. 158 When a
juvenile adjudication is used to increase an adult sentence under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines or Three Strikes, the adjudication is used
for a punishment purpose. Thus, the treatment-only justification that

154. Id (citing United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
The court noted that while a juvenile may not have received a "conviction," the juvenile
did in fact violate a criminal statute. Id
155. Id The court observed, "The practice of considering prior juvenile
adjudications at sentencing, a practice authorized in the Federal Youth Corrections Act,
18 U.S.C. § 5038(a)(2), has long been accepted." Id (citations omitted).
156. See United States v. Holland, 26 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding it proper to
consider juvenile adjudications in sentencing, even though Texas law does not equate
juvenile adjudications and criminal convictions); United States v. Kirby, 893 F.2d 867
(6th Cir. 1990) (permitting consideration of a juvenile record in sentencing); United
States v. Booten, 914 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling it does not violate due process
to consider juvenile adjudications as criminal convictions for sentence enhancement
purposes); United States v. Mackbee, 894 F .2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding due process
rights were not violated when a sentence for possession of a controlled substance was
enhanced based on prior juvenile adjudications).
157. See David Dormont, Note, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1791 (1991) (discussing the use ofjuvenile adjudications under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines). See also Circuit Judge Wald's dissenting opinion in
Johnson, 28 F.3d at 159, which cites Dormont's note.
Another commentator observed: "Many courts have rejected this argument [the
absence of a jury trial should limit the use of juvenile adjudications to increase adult
sentences] with a conclusory reference to McKeiver. See, e.g., State v. Little, 423
N.W.2d 722, 724-25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) . .. United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d
212, 215 (9th Cir. 1989) ...." Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A
Case Study ofJuvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1063 n.434 (1995).
158. Dormont, supra note 157, at 1790. See also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 552 (1971) (White, J., concurring) ("Supervision or confinement is aimed at
rehabilitation, not at convincing the juvenile of his error simply by imposing pains and
penalties."); Barry C. Feld, The TransformationoftheJuvenileCourt, 75 MINNL. REv.
691, 696 (1991). Feld asserts that "[t]he McKeiver Court justified the procedural
differences between juvenile and criminal courts on the basis of the former's treatment
rationale and the latter's punitive purposes." Id
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permits the lower due process standard in the juvenile system is not
served by this subsequent punitive use of the juvenile adjudication. 159
In denying a juvenile a right to a jury trial, the McKeiver Court also
assumed that a juvenile adjudication would not adversely affect a person
when he or she became an adult. 160 When a juvenile adjudication is
used to enhance an adult sentence, the juvenile adjudication obviously
adversely affects the person in adulthood. In McKeiver, Justice White
observed that "the consequences of adjudication are less severe than
those flowing from verdicts of criminal guilt." 161 Under Three Strikes,
the initial consequences of juvenile adjudications and criminal convictions may still differ. However, if a person is subsequently convicted of
a felony as an adult, the consequences of qualifying juvenile adjudications and criminal convictions are identical-each count as one strike.
In short, one could argue that the Three Strikes juvenile adjudication
provisions violate due process because the use of juvenile adjudications
to enlarge sentences permits an adjudication to be used for a nontreatment purpose and allows the adjudication to have a significant and
onerous impact on an adult. Although this argument has some merit, it
will likely fail. The United States Supreme Court has not yet considered
whether it is constitutionally permissible to use juvenile adjudications to
enhance adult sentences. However, the Court's decision in Nichols v.
United States 162 suggests that the juvenile adjudication provisions of
Three Strikes will pass constitutional muster.

159. Dormont, supra note 157, at 1793-94.
160. Id. at 1790. Dormont suggests this assumption is inherent in the McKeiver
Court's decision. Id. at 1790 n.105. As support for this proposition, Dormont noted the
McKeiverCourt stated a delinquency finding was "significantly different from and less
onerous than a finding of criminal guilt." Id. (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 540 (1971)). Dormont also cites Justice White's concurring opinion in
McKeiverto illustrate Justice White's assumption that the child would not be stigmatized
by a finding of delinquency. Id. Justice White stated:
Reprehensible acts by juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature and
malevolent choice but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other
forces beyond their control. Hence the state legislative judgment not to
stigmatize the juvenile delinquent by branding him a criminal; his conduct is
not deemed so blameworthy that a punishment is required to deter him or
others.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
161. 403 U.S. at 553 (White, J., concurring).
162. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994) (6-3 decision).
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The issue in Nichols was whether a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction of the defendant, which was valid under Scott v. Jllinois 163
because no term of imprisonment was imposed, could be considered in
sentencing the defendant for his current conviction. 164 The Nichols
Court observed that the Scott Court held that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel cases had expanded the language of this right well "beyond
its obvious meaning" and, therefore, the Scott Court drew a line between
cases that did and did not result in actual imprisonment; the right to
counsel attaches only when imprisonment is imposed. 165 The Nichols
Court then stated that a "logical consequence of the holding is that an
uncounseled conviction valid under Scott may be relied upon to enhance
the sentence for a subsequent offense, even though that sentence entails
imprisonment." 166 The Court explained that the sentencing statute did
not change the penalty for the prior conviction. 167 Moreover, the
Court noted that the consideration of prior uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions in sentencing was consistent with traditional sentencing
procedures, and that judges considered many factors in sentencing that
may constitutionally include criminal behavior not resulting in a
conviction. 168 The Court observed:
[C]onsistently with due process, petitioner in the present case could have been
sentenced more severely based simply on evidence of the underlying conduct
which gave rise to the previous DUI offense. And the state need prove such
conduct only by a preponderance of the evidence. Surely, then, it must be
constitutionally permissible to consider a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction based on the same conduct where that conduct must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. 169

163. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). In Scott, an indigent convicted of shoplifting was fined
$50 in a bench trial. The maximum penalty for the crime was $500 and one year in jail.
Scott appealed the conviction because the state did not provide him counsel. The
Supreme Court held, "The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed
counsel in his defense." Id at 373-74.
164. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
165. Id at 1927 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1979)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id at 1927-28.
169. Id at 1928 (citation omitted).
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Accordingly, in Nichols, the Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision
in Baldasar v. Illinois 170 and held that the uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction could be used to impose an increased sentence. 171
Like the prior conviction at issue in Nichols, a juvenile adjudication
without a jury trial does not violate a juvenile's due process rights.
Also, the Three Strikes use of a juvenile adjudication in sentencing does
not alter the treatment purpose of the earlier juvenile adjudication. If it
is constitutionally permissible to increase a sentence based upon conduct
underlying an offense that did not result in a conviction and that was
proved by a preponderance of evidence, then certainly it is permissible
to use a finding of delinquency that was obtained in a procedure that
provided a right to notice, counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination,
in addition to requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 172 Moreover, unlike an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, a juvenile
adjudication may be used to deprive someone of his or her liberty. 173
Because it is constitutional to enhance a sentence based on an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, even though no deprivation of
liberty could be imposed as a direct result of the offense, then surely it
is permissible to use a juvenile adjudication, which could have been used
to deprive someone of liberty in the first instance, to increase an adult

170. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 1921 (1994). In Baldasar, the Court held that a prior uncounseled conviction that
was valid under Scott could not be considered under Illinois's enhancement statute.
Justice Marshall stated, "A rule that held a conviction invalid for imposing a prison term
directly, but valid for imposing a prison term collaterally, would be an illogical and
unworkable deviation from our previous cases." Id. at 228-29 (Marshall, J., concurring).
I 71. Nichols, I 14 S. Ct. at 1927-28. The Court held that "we adhere to Scott v.
Illinois . .. and overrule Baldasar." Id. at 1928.
I 72. See United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212,215 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1027 (1990). Williams claimed that considerationofhisjuvenile adjudications
in calculating his sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated his due
process rights. Id. at 214. After approving the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance
convictions, the court observed that prior to the sentencing guidelines, courts had upheld
sentencing enhancements based on a prior offense that resulted in an acquittal and based
on an arrest underlying a void conviction. The court opined:
If a judge could have enhanced a sentence because of factors which have not
been fully adjudicated with due process guarantees, a judge can enhance a
sentence due to a prior adjudication when ... the defendant has had such due
process safeguards as the right to counsel and the right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses.
Id. at 215.
173. Id. at 215.
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sentence. 174 Accordingly, in view of Nichols, Three Strikes' use of
juvenile adjudications will likely withstand a due process challenge. 175
One distinction between Three Strikes and the sentencing guidelines
considered in Nichols is that the sentencing guidelines at issue in Nichols
allowed judges to increase or decrease punishment within a specified
range. Thus, the guidelines at issue in Nichols allowed for judicial
discretion to depart downwards based on the circumstances of the prior
conviction. 176 In contrast, Three Strikes provides automatic sentence
increases whenever a defendant has a prior felony conviction as defined
by the statute. 177 Under Three Strikes, the prosecutor must prove the
prior convictions. The prosecution can move to dismiss a prior strike
when insufficient evidence exists to prove the prior conviction or when
the dismissal would be in the furtherance of justice. 178 The court can
dismiss or strike the alleged prior felony upon a finding that insufficient
evidence exists to prove the past felony. 179 However, the Three
Strikes provisions do not appear to allow a court discretion to strike a

174. See id. The Williams court also noted that the right to counsel had been
deemed more fundamental than a jury trial right. Id. (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 46 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)). Thus, if it is permissible to enhance a
sentence based upon a disposition in which the defendant was not afforded the more
fundamental right of counsel, then it should be permissible to increase a sentence based
upon a proceeding where the person was afforded the right to counsel but not the less
fundamental right to a jury trial.
175. See United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151, 153 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In
upholding the use of juvenile adjudications to increase sentences under the federal
sentencing guidelines, the Johnson court stated "[i]n light of Nichols, there is no reason
why a constitutional non-jury juvenile adjudication may not be used in the same way."
Id.
176. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
The guidelines specifically authorize downward departures when a defendant's criminal
category over-represents the seriousness of the criminal history. Id.
, 177. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(f)(l), 1170.12 (d)(l) (West Supp. 1995). Section
667(f)(l) states: "Notwithstanding any other law, subdivisions(b) to (i), inclusive, shall
be applied in every case in which a defendant has a prior felony conviction as defined
in subdivision (d). The prosecuting attorney shall plead and prove each prior felony
conviction except as provided in paragraph (2)." CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(f)(l) (West
Supp. 1995). Section 1170.12(d)(l) is essentially the same.
178. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(f)(2), ll 70.12(d)(2) (West Supp. 1995). These
identical provisions state: "The prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss or strike a
prior felony conviction allegation in the furtherance ofjustice pursuant to Section 1385,
or if there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior conviction." Id.
179. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(f)(2), 1170.12(d)(2) (West Supp. 1995). These
identical provisions state: "If upon the satisfaction of the court that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the prior felony conviction, the court may dismiss or strike the
allegation." Id.
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prior conviction in the interests of justice 180 or give less weight to a
juvenile adjudication the prosecution has proved.
Justice Souter noted, in his concurring opinion in Nichols, that the
Baldasar Court considered a sentencing framework that provided
automatic increased sentencing. 181 In contrast, the sentencing guidelines at issue in Nichols reasonably accommodated Sixth Amendment
reliability concerns because of the allowance for downward departures
in cases involving less reliable convictions. 182 Accordingly, Justice
Souter viewed the use of an uncounseled conviction for increasing a
sentence as constitutional under the non-automatic sentencing provisions.
Justice Souter cautioned, "I am shy, however, of endorsing language in
the Court's opinion that may be taken as addressing the constitutional
validity of a sentencing scheme that automatically requires enhancement
for prior uncounseled convictions .... " 183
One could argue that the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance a
sentence under Three Strikes is unconstitutional because the court has no
discretion to strike a questionable juvenile adjudication. 184 A study on

180. The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed this issue in People v. Superior
Court (Romero), 31 Cal. App. 4th 653, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (1995), reviewgrantedand
opinion superseded by People v. Superior Court (Romero), 892 P.2d 804, 40 Cal. Rptr.
2d 308 (Apr. 13, 1995). In Romero, the court of appeal held that the trial court could
not strike a prior felony conviction on its own motion under both versions of Three
Strikes and that this limitation on the court's power did not constitute a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine.
In contrast, the First District Court of Appeal approved a judge's refusal to follow
Three Strikes and double a sentence. Philip Carrizosa, Court Won't Overturn 3 Strike
Refusal, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 19, 1994, at 1. The defendant had a 10-year-old residential
burglary conviction when he was caught with eight grams of marijuana outside a county
honor farm where he was serving a 120-day shoplifting sentence. The sentence should
have been four, six, or eight years under Three Strikes. The judge ordered the accused
.to a drug treatment program instead. In an unpublished order, the court of appeal
affirmed the order. Id. at 1, 12.
181. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
182. Id
183. Id. at 1931 (emphasis added).
184. In United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 1995), a case involving
a due process challenge to the use of juvenile adjudications in sentencing under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the court stated:
Lest one believe that this system punishes a defendant too harshly for
offenses committed while he was young and foolish, the Guidelines authorize
the sentencing judge to adjust a defendant's criminal history if the judge
believes the criminal history does not adequately reflect the defendant's past
conduct or his tendency to recidivism. . . . The scheme, then, is designed to
meet the sentencing objectives while maintaining a sense of fairness by
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the conviction 185 rates of juvenile and criminal courts in California
found that juveniles were convicted for a higher percentage of comparably charged crimes than were adults. 186 This difference might be
attributable to the evils from which the jury trial protects the accused-"corrupt or overzealous prosecutor[s] and . . . compliant, biased
or eccentric judge[s]." 187 The distinction may also be attributable to
other factors including the heavy juvenile court caseloads that may result
in the court becoming "less meticulous in considering the evidence" or
the court applying "less stringent concepts of reasonable doubt and
presumption of innocence." 188 In view of the difference in the conviction rates between juveniles and adults and possible explanations for this
disparity, judicial discretion is arguably necessary to ensure that a
juvenile adjudication is sufficiently reliable.
An argument challenging the use of juvenile adjudications in
sentencing, based on the lack of judicial discretion in Three Strikes,
would, however, likely fail. While Justice Souter viewed the lack of
discretion as a distinguishing feature between the sentencing frameworks
at issue in Baldasar and Nichols, 189 the majority did not, as evidenced
by its decision to expressly overrule Baldasar in Nichols. 190 Also, the
reliability of an uncounseled conviction is arguably more questionable
than a juvenile adjudication. The Court gave retrospective effect to its
decision recognizing a right to counsel in state criminal trials but not to

offering the sentencing judge some discretion. Accordingly, the consideration
of a defendant's juvenile record is important to achieving the congressional
goals of federal sentencing, is not "unfair," and does not remotely infringe on
the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.
Id.

185. Technically, juveniles are not convicted. Instead, they are adjudged a ward of
the court. See supra note 68.
186. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing The Legal
Order: The Case/or Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1124 n.272
(1991).
187. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1967). See also Feld, supra note
158, at 719. After noting the McKeiverCourt equated the factual accuracy of juvenile
and adult adjudications, Feld states:
McKeiversimply ignored that constitutional procedures also prevent governmental oppression. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court held that adult criminal
proceedings required a jury to assure both factual accuracy and protection
against governmental oppression. Duncan emphasized that juries protect
against a weak or biased judge, inject the community's values into law, and
increase the visibility and accountability of justice administration. These
protective functions are even more crucial in juvenile courts that labor behind
closed doors, immune from public scrutiny.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
188. Ainsworth, supra note 186, at 1124.
189. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (1994)(Souter, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 1928.
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the jury trial right recognized in Duncan. 191 The McKeiver Court
noted that Duncan would have been applied retrospectively if "the
integrity of the result was seriously at issue." 192 The fact that the right
to counsel was given retrospective application, while the right to a jury
trial was not, suggests the Court was more concerned about the integrity
of an uncounseled conviction than the results of bench trials. Accordingly, even though Three Strikes does not appear to permit judges to
review the reliability of a prior juvenile adjudication that the prosecution
has pled and proved, the juvenile adjudication portions of Three Strikes
will still likely be deemed constitutional.
In short, although the juvenile justice system does not afford juveniles
the same procedural rights that adults have in the criminal courts, and
Three Strikes does not appear to give judges discretion to review the
reliability of prior juvenile adjudications, this portion of Three Strikes
will likely withstand a due process challenge in light of the existing case
law, in particular the Nichols decision.

B.

Challenges to the Use of Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence
Enhancements Under the California Constitution

If the Three Strikes provisions regarding juvenile adjudications survive
a due process challenge under the United States Constitution, a second

191. See Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 ( 1963) (granting the petitions for
writs of certiorari, vacating the judgments, and remanding the cases for further
consideration in view of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which recognized
a right to counsel in state criminal trials, giving it retrospective effect); DeStefano v.
Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 (1968) (refusing to give Duncan retroactive effect).
Justice Powell noted that the Court gave retroactive effect to the Gideon ruling in
Pickelsimer. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 46 n.6 (1972). However, one
commentator suggests that in Pickelsimer, "[t]he justices had not themselves made the
decision to apply the new rule retrospectively, but they seemed to be inviting the Florida
court to do so." ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 205 (1964).
192. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). Compare Gideon, 372
U.S. at 344 ("[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.") with Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158
("We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial - orany particular trial-held
before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a
judge as he would be by a jury."). See also Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 46 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he interest protected by the right to have guilt or innocence determined
by a jury-tempering the possibly arbitrary and harsh exercise of prosecutorial and
judicial power-while important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a fair trial as
is the right to counsel.").
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basis for challenging their use may exist under the California Constitution. The Javier A. court provided a compelling explanation of why
juveniles should be afforded the right to trial by jury under California
law, based on an historical analysis of the English common law in
1850. 193 Per Javier A., juvenile adjudications are unconstitutional
because of the lack of a right to trial by jury.
Under California law, an individual may challenge the constitutional
validity of a prior conviction that is used to increase a subsequent
sentence. 194 If the California Supreme Court adopts Javier A. 's
reasoning and holds that juveniles have a constitutional right to trial by
jury, then the use of prior juvenile adjudications to increase sentences
under Three Strikes would be subject to a collateral attack. However,
these attacks would likely fail if based solely on the lack of a jury trial.
As the McKeiver Court noted, when Duncan established the right to trial
by jury in state criminal proceedings, the right was not applied
retrospectively, which indicates that the integrity of a bench trial result
was not at issue. 195 Moreover, because it has been more than ten years
since the Javier A. court urged the California Supreme Court to
reconsider a juvenile's right to a jury trial, it is doubtful that the
California Supreme Court will reconsider the In re Daedler decision in
the near future.
C.

Equal Protection Challenges to the Use of Juvenile Adjudications
Under Three Strikes

A second class of constitutional challenges to the use of juvenile
adjudications under Three Strikes involves the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution196 and
Article I, Section Seven of the California Constitution. 197 The California Court of Appeal for the Second District addressed one of the

193. In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 929-50, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 396-411
(1984); see supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
194. In re Woods, 64 Cal. 2d 3, 409 P.2d 913, 48 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1966) (holding
that a prior conviction without counsel or waiver was subject to collateral attack if the
prosecution attempted to use the prior conviction in subsequent proceedings). In
addition, the California Supreme Court has also held that the determination that a prior
conviction was invalid was res judicata as to any related proceeding that attempts to
increase a sentence based on the invalid prior. Thomas v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 3 Cal. 3d 335, 475 P.2d 858, 90 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1970).
195. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). See supra note 40 for
the exact text of the McKeiver Court's reasoning on this issue.
196. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
197. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) ("A person may not be deprived oflife, liberty or
property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws .... ").

1338

[VOL. 32: 1297, 1995]

Three Strikes Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

potential equal protection challenges to the use of juvenile adjudications
under Three Strikes in People v. Peterson. 198
Peterson argued that the use of a juvenile adjudication to double his
current sentence under Three Strikes violated his equal protection rights
because defendants with prior criminal convictions were afforded rights
that those with prior juvenile adjudications did not receive. 199 Peterson
stated that because of this treatment, juvenile offenders, as a class, are
treated differently to their disadvantage because of their youth. 200
Under Three Strikes, juvenile offenders who did not have a right to a
trial by jury are being punished in the same manner as adult offenders
who were afforded this right. 201 The Peterson court rejected this
argument, stating that "we [are not] persuaded that a constitutional
problem arises under California's three strikes law because someone with
adjudications of juvenile delinquency is subject to the same sentence as
a person with prior adult criminal convictions."202
Although the Peterson court denied the equal protection claim,
defendants with prior juvenile adjudications and thos.e with prior
criminal convictions are arguably not similarly situated because of the
fundamental differences between the two systems; 203 most significantly
criminal defendants have a right to ajury trial but juveniles do not. The
Peterson court dismissed the defendant's challenge without reference to
what standard of review applied. 204 Other Three Strikes cases have not

198. 40 Cal. App. 4th 1479, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318 (1995).
199. Id. at 1485, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1487, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322. The federal courts have reached the same
conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding that although differences in the juvenile and criminal systems exist, in view of
the purposes of the sentencing guidelines, which include deterrence, protection of the
public, and promotion of respect for the law, the sentencing commission did not act
unreasonably in equating juvenile adjudications and criminal convictions).
203. In In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 530, 601 P.2d 549, 557, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317,
320-21 (1979), the California Supreme Court stated: "Adults convicted in the criminal
courts and sentenced to prison and youths adjudged wards of the juvenile courts and
committed to the Youth Authority are not 'similarly situated."' Id. Presumably, adults
with prior juvenile adjudications and those with criminal convictions are also not
similarly situated because the state did "not have the same purpose in sentencing adults
to prison that it has in committing minors to the Youth Authority." Id. at 531, 601 P.2d
at 558, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
204. People v. Peterson, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1479, 1486-88, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318,322
(1995).
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clearly resolved this issue. In one case, the court appeared to apply the
rational basis standard of review. 205 Under the rational basis standard,
a statute will be upheld if the state shows that a rational relationship
exists between the classification and a legitimate state purpose. 206
However, in another Three Strikes case, the court acknowledged that the
strict scrutiny standard of review might apply because a fundamental
interest that is recognized by the California Supreme Court, personal
liberty, was at stake. 207 Under the strict scrutiny standard, Three
Strikes would only be upheld if its classifications are necessary to
achieve a compelling government interest. 208
In addressing the issue of government interest, the Court of Appeal for
the Second District held that "[t]he state has a compelling interest in the
protection of public safety and in preventing and punishing recidivism."209 As one commentator observed, "A record of persistent
offending, whether as a juvenile or as an adult, is the 'best evidence' of
career criminality."210 In California, the estimated recidivism rate for
the county juvenile probation camps is 63.5% and the adult recidivist
rate is 69. 7%. 211
Therefore, treating juvenile adjudications like

205. People v. McCain, 36 Cal. App. 4th 817, 820, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 780-81
(1995) (holding that the fact that a person who committed a serious felony, but had no
priors, could earn more credits than a recidivist who committed a non-violent felony did
not constitute an equal protection violation because "we cannot say harsher treatment for
such recidivists is irrational or arbitrary such that it denies them equal protection under
the law").
206. People v. Applin, 40 Cal. App. 4th 404,408, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 864 (1995).
207. Id. at 409, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864-65. The court noted that the California
Supreme Court had recognized personal liberty as a fundamental interest in People v.
Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236,551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976), which would seem to
indicate that strict scrutiny is required. Applin, 40 Cal. App. 4th at 408-09, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 864. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Olivas
decision. However, the Applin court also recognized that a split of authority existed on
what standard applies in challenges to statutes involving aspects of criminal sentences.
Applin, 40 Cal. App. 4th at 409, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864-65. However, the court did not
reach the issue of which standard should apply because the defendant, a recidivist, was
not similarly situated to murderers and pre-conviction detainees. Id. at 409, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 865.
208. Applin, 40 Cal. App. 4th at 408, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
209. People v. Jerez, 208 Cal. App. 3d 132, 140, 256 Cal. Rptr. 31, 36 (1989)
(holding that a statute that increased punishment for prior serious felony convictions
differently depending upon whether prior offenses were consolidated into one proceeding
or brought and tried separately did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
210. Feld, supra note 157, at 1058.
211. CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY lNSTITUTE, CALIFORNIA CHILDREN'S BUDGET, 199596, 8-5 (1995) (citing LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, PUTTING VIOLENCE BEHIND BARS:
REDEFINING THE ROLES OF CALIFORNIA'S PRISONS 68 (1994)). Additionally, the
juvenile violent crime rate in 1992 was 650.1 per 100,000 population. Id. at 8-28 (citing
LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, THE JUVENILE CRIME CHALLENGE: MAKING PREVENTION
A PRIORITY 7, 9 (1994)).
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criminal convictions is arguably necessary to achieve the compelling
state interests of protecting public safety and preventing and punishing
recidivism. 212 Because the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance
adult sentences will likely survive strict scrutiny, the provisions should
also be upheld under the less rigorous rational basis review.
However, Three Strikes' treatment of certain offenses as strikes only
when committed by juveniles likely violates the Equal Protection Clauses
of the United States and California Constitutions. A successful equal
protection claim requires a threshold showing that the statute affects two
similarly situated groups unequally. 213 In People v. Olivas, 214 the
California Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to a
statute that authorized juveniles convicted of an offense in an adult court
to be committed to the California Youth Authority for a longer term than
the maximum jail sentence. The court stated that although Olivas was
not a member of a suspect class, a fundamental interest was at stake,
namely Olivas's personal liberty, and, therefore, the strict scrutiny
standard of review applied. 215 The Olivas court invalidated the statute
because it did not serve a compelling government interest. 216

212. But see Feld, supra note 157, at 1011 n.197. Feld cites Three Strikes as an
example of a misguided sentencing policy. Feld notes that by the time a person usually
has acquired a criminal record that would trigger Three Strikes, the person is on the
down slope of criminal activity. Because Three Strikes does not account for this factor,
the result will likely be "geriatric prisons housing older offenders with low probabilities
of recidivism." Id
213. In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 601 P.2d 549, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1979). The
California Supreme Court stated: "The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the
equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects
two or more similarlysituatedgroups in an unequal manner." Id at 530, 601 P.2d at
553, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
214. 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976). Under the law
challenged in Olivas, the defendant would have served in excess of three years in the
California Youth Authority for conviction ofa misdemeanor that carried a maximum jail
term of six months. Id at 241-42, 551 P.2d at 378, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
215. Id at 244,551 P.2d at 380, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 60. The court defined personal
liberty as including freedom from incarceration, restraints associated with parole, and
other controls by authority. The court noted that while it may seem obvious that
personal liberty is a fundamental interest, a split of authority exists on the issue among
the state and federal courts. Id at 246-47, 551 P.2d at 381-82, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 61-62.
216. Id at 255,551 P.2d at 387, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 67. The court stated:
Even though we agree that the state has an interest in the rehabilitation of
youthful offenders we have not been shown how this sentencing scheme is
necessary to further that interest. Assuming arguendo that rehabilitation is a
compelling state interest, we cannot determine what minimum period of
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Unequal confinement periods for the commission of the same past
crime may also arise under Three Strikes. Consider the following
hypothetical. Two adults are each convicted of murder. Both have
previously been convicted of selling one ounce of PCP to an adult. In
their previous drug cases, one was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court,
but the other was convicted in a criminal proceeding. The two adults
are similarly situated. However, under Three Strikes, a prior conviction
for selling PCP to an adult only counts as a strike if the crime was
committed by a juvenile. 217 Thus, under Three Strikes, only the adult
with the juvenile adjudication will get a double sentence based on his or
her prior felony conviction.
In this hypothetical Three Strikes case, as in Olivas, an individual's
liberty is at stake. Therefore, a court ,would likely follow Olivas and
require the existence of a compelling government interest that justifies
the discriminatory categories in the Three Strikes laws. No stated
government interest justifies confining an adult who committed a prior
offense when he or she was a juvenile longer than an adult who
committed the same prior offense when he or she was an adult.
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine any possible justification that the
legislature or voters could have intended. Accordingly, the provisions
that define some offenses as strikes only if they are committed by
juveniles likely violate the Equal Protection Clauses.
Another potential equal protection claim exists when a prior juvenile
adjudication was based exclusively on the uncorroborated testimony of
an accomplice. Section 1111 of the Penal Code provides: "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be
corroborated. . . .''21 8 While Section 701 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides that the California Rules of Evidence apply in
juvenile proceedings, 219 the courts have refused to apply the Penal
Code's uncorroborated accomplice testimony rule in juvenile court.
The California Supreme Court considered whether a finding of
delinquency based solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony
violated the juvenile's equal protection rights. 220 The court applied the

confinement is sufficient to achieve the state's goal of meaningful rehabilitation.

Id
217. See supra note 105 for statutory references.
218. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1111 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
219. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 701 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995). The text
provides "admission and exclusion of evidence shall be pursuant to the rules of evidence
esfablished by the Evidence Code and by judicial decision." Id
220. In re Mitchell P., 22 Cal. 3d 946, 587 P.2d 1144, 151 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1978),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 845 (1979). Mitchell was found to have committed the offenses
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rational basis standard of review to determine whether a legitimate
government interest was served by allowing uncorroborated accomplice
testimony to be used as the sole basis for confinement in juvenile but not
criminal court. 221
In Mitchell P., the court noted that accomplice testimony was
"generally suspect because it may have been proffered in the hope of
leniency or immunity, and thus greater weight may be accorded such
testimony than is warranted."222 However, as the court observed,
juveniles are only entitled to bench trials, and a judge, unlike a jury,
would be more critical of this testimony. The court also pointed out that
due process did not require the accomplice corroboration rule. 223
Moreover, the court asserted that because a criminal defendant faces a
more onerous term of confinement than a juvenile, it was reasonable to
place more severe limitations on admissible evidence in a criminal
proceeding. Accordingly, the court rejected the equal protection
challenge and concluded that the different standards of evidentiary
procedures were permissible because California's juvenile justice system
met other constitutional demands. 224

of burglary, grand theft, and receiving stolen property. The accomplice who testified
against Mitchell had been granted immunity. Id at 948, 587 P.2d at 1146, 151 Cal.
Rptr. at 333.
221. Id The court stated:
There is no basis herein for application of the 'strict scrutiny' as opposed to
the 'rationality' test in measuring permissible classifications. We do not here
make a classification directly affecting a fundamental interest as in Olivas .. ..
Here, there is no classification based on a deprivation of liberty or any other
fundamental right. The classification affects only the kind-but not the
degree-of otherwise proper evidence which may support a finding of
misconduct.
Id at 950-51 n.3, 587 P.2d at 1147 n.3, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 334 n.3.
222. Id. at 951, 587 P.2d at 1148-49, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 334-35. The court noted:
Although the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court may not warrant a
lesser degree of proof of the charged misconduct, the Legislature may well
consider that judicial intervention in the interest of rehabilitating an impressionable minor outweighs policies against the use of particular kinds of
testimony not otherwise constitutionally proscribed.
Id. at 952, 587 P.2d at 1148, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
223. Id. at 949, 587 P.2d at 1147, 151 Cal. Rptr at 333. The court stated that the
accomplice corroboration rule was not required by the U.S. Constitution. The court
observed that many states did not apply the rule and the federal courts had rejected the
rule. Id.
224. Id. at 953, 587 P.2d at 1149, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 336. The court suggested that
"ifthere are sufficient distinctions between criminal and juvenile proceedings to justify
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The dissent made several valid points in Mitchell P. First, in 1975,
the United States Supreme Court found few distinctions between the
consequences of a juvenile adjudication and a criminal conviction in
California. 225 The California juvenile justice system had not significantly changed since that date. Second, the case was not merely about
the quality of evidence. Under the holding of the majority in Mitchell
P., in two identical cases where the only evidence was an uncorroborated accomplice's testimony, a juvenile could be confined, but an adult
could not be confined as a matter of law. 226 Under Three Strikes, a
prior juvenile adjudication based solely on uncorroborated accomplice
testimony should not count as a prior felony conviction. The initial
confinement likely violated the juvenile's equal protection rights. The
subsequent use of the same juvenile adjudication compounds the problem
because the person with the juvenile prior would receive double the
sentence for the current offense, but another adult with an identical past
case would not have suffered a conviction and, therefore, would not be
subject to Three Strikes sentencing.
In sum, the Three Strikes laws will likely withstand a facial equal
protection challenge. However, the provision that designates some
offenses as a strike only if committed by a juvenile will likely be
deemed unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
If the prior juvenile adjudication was based solely upon uncorroborated
accomplice testimony, it should arguably not count as a strike because
an adult would not have suffered a felony conviction in the identical
circumstances as a matter of law. However, in light of the California
Supreme Court's rejection of the equal protection argument in In re
granting the constitutional right to a jury to the former and denying it to the latter, those
same distinctions must also apply to the quality of evidence." Id.
225. Id. at 961, 587 P.2d at 1154, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)). Breed involved a double jeopardy
challenge. The defendant, a juvenile, was first adjudicated in the juvenile court. After
two prosecution witnesses testified, the juvenile court judge held the defendant was not
a "fit and proper" subject for juvenile court. Thereafter, the juvenile was certified to and
convicted in a criminal court. The Breed Court observed that "in terms of potential
consequences, there is little to distinguish an adjudicatory hearing such as was held in
this case from a traditional criminal prosecution." Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530
(1975). The Court also found few distinctions between a juvenile adjudication
proceeding under the Welfare and Institutions Code and a criminal trial. Accordingly,
the Court held that the ban on double jeopardy applied in juvenile proceedings. Id. at
541.
226. Mitchel!P., 22 Cal. 3d at 963,587 P.2d at 1156, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 342. The
dissent' s analysis of the accomplice corroboration rule in criminal and juvenile courts
focused on a fundamental interest-personal liberty. Accordingly, the dissent viewed the
majority's application of"the rational basis test, rather than a strict scrutiny analysis, to
the minor's equal protection claim" as "dubious at best." Id. at 960 n. 13, 587 P.2d at
1154 n.13, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 341 n.13.
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Mitchell, it is not certain that the courts would reach the same conclusion.
V.

CONCLUSION

Because the courts will likely uphold the use of juvenile adjudications
under Three Strikes, the legislature should amend227 the provisions as
follows. First, the portions of the Three Strikes provisions that reference
offenses listed in Section 707(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code
should be eliminated, as well as the requirement that the juvenile be
adjudged a ward of the court for committing an offense listed in section
707(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 228 Deleting these portions
of the statutes will eliminate the problem of some prior convictions
counting as strikes only when committed by a juvenile. Second, the
legislature should consolidate sections 667 and 1170.12 of the Penal
Code. The Three Strikes statutes are similar in most respects, but they
contain discrepancies in some key areas. Consolidation of the two
statutes would eliminate differences and confusion. If these changes are
made to the Three Strikes laws, many of the inconsistencies and
problems that have been pointed out in this Comment will be eliminated.
LISE FORQUER

227. Both statutes provide for amendment with two-thirds approval of both houses
of the legislature or by a voter-approved statute. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(1), 1170.12
(West Supp. 1995).
228. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(d)(3)(D), l l 70.12(b)(3)(D)(West Supp. 1995); see
supra note 99.
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